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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IS CONFLICT SENSITIVITY APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYMENT?  \ GRAWERT, HANSOHM, NUSRAT
“Conflict-sensitivity” is a catchword that addresses business practices in envi-
ronments of armed conflict. The United Nations Global Compact and interna-
tional finance institutions are devoting efforts into convincing companies to 
comply with principles aiming to provide the private sector with a role in 
peacebuilding. They portray employment creation as a key factor in attracting 
young people away from joining armed groups. This Working Paper introduces 
the term “conflict-sensitive employment” in order to shift the focus towards 
the job-related role of private business in conflict environments. A critical 
analysis of relevant documents and scholarly debates reveals major dilemmas. 
The almost complete absence of a regulatory state in the fragile and con-
flict-affected settings (FCAS) where protracted violence usually occurs contra-
dicts the principle of the rule of law. The profit-orientation of investors and 
companies venturing into business in FCAS primarily tends to eclipse efforts 
towards decent employment. Workers may prefer offers provided by the war 
economy over civilian employment if it does not open up a long-term perspec-
tive. The Paper identifies two disparate narratives underlying the debate: The 
liberal peace ideal with its presumption of a harmonious society informs ap-
proaches to assign peacebuilding tasks to the private sector.  A political econo-
my perspective reveals that corrupt states and governments are an integral 
part of political marketplaces organized in the  
interest of businesspeople and competing powerholders. The tentative result 
of the analysis is that conflict-sensitive employment may be possible if it pays. 
Empirical research at the micro-level in FCAS is required to clarify if conflict- 
sensitivity is a viable approach.  
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recovery and, through an adequate legal and regula-
tory framework, to attract private investment. They 
claim that transparency is important in order to con-
strain the high potential for rent seeking, especially 
in resource-rich countries. They consider the role of 
government in contributing to the creation of appro-
priate conditions for pro-growth entrepreneurship 
and adequate support of private sector development 
(PSD) as vital, and some even propagate a ‘develop-
ment state’ to revamp the private sector. These stud-
ies do not address the fact that in many countries 
with violent conflict the wished-for strong state in-
cluding its potentially mediating and regulatory in-
stitutions is absent or even an integral part of the 
problem, contributing to protract armed conflict. This 
inevitably leads to weak incentives towards coopera-
tion within society. It produces gains for opportun-
ists preying on cooperating groups with the conse-
quence that trust within society erodes. 
Infrastructure-building can enhance 
conflict or contribute to peace, if  
systematically planned; however, the 
impact of external assistance on eco-
nomic outcomes is under-researched
Building infrastructure requires long-term fund-
ing. According to macro-economic surveys, electricity 
projects emerge about three years after the end of 
violent conflict and grow after five years. Private in-
vestment in transport, roads, railways and water 
starts much later. Cellular telephone network infra-
structures, however, attract private investors even un-
der conflict conditions, obviously because customers 
directly pay for the service. Public infrastructures rely 
on functioning state institutions which after violent 
conflict usually have a low absorptive capacity and 
are unable to distribute high amounts of aid. However, 
foreign assistance tends to be high immediately after 
war and to fade out when state institutions have 
gained the capacity to channel funds towards infra-
structure investment. Scholars seeking to link invest-
ment to peacebuilding hold that rapid restoration of 
essential services such as water, sanitation and elec-
tricity will encourage the perception of a return to 
Violent conflict affects economic sectors 
differently, and rebuilding war-torn 
economies requires case-specific  
approaches; micro-level studies,  
however, are rare
Economists point out that war reduces economic 
growth. It destroys assets, damages public institu-
tions and regulatory compliance and thus enhances 
corruption. Violent conflict limits access to finance 
and labour and discards land ownership. It destroys 
infrastructure, distorts markets, and hampers tax col-
lection. War interrupts production and trade and 
causes massive capital flight. It kills workers and en-
trepreneurs or compels them to flee. Sectors that are 
intensive in capital and transactions (manufacturing), 
as well as sectors that supply capital (construction) 
and transactions (transport, trade, finance), contract 
most rapidly whereas subsistence agriculture expands. 
Scholars caution that peace does not necessarily pro-
duce a dividend, because it neither recreates the fiscal 
nor the risk characteristics of the pre-war economy. 
Military expenditure is higher and the risk of re-
newed war greater, because the causes of war mostly 
persist during reconstruction. There is no blueprint 
for rebuilding war-torn economies; factor conditions 
such as land, labour and capital require country- 
specific consideration. Criteria such as the state of 
existing institutions, severity and duration of violent 
conflict, its root causes and effects should inform re-
form strategies. No rigorous evidence yet exists on 
which types of programmes are most effective at 
overcoming war’s adverse impact on human capital. 
Many peacebuilding approaches to  
reconstruction presume a strong state, 
which contradicts the fragile and  
conflict-affected settings (FCAS)  
prevailing after violent conflict; many 
studies ignore this dilemma
Although it is known that civil and economic in-
stitutions, as the state, are the main victims of war, 
especially internal war, many studies emphasise the 
need for a strong state to guarantee stability and 
Main findings
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thereof are a legacy which shapes the economy for a 
long time after the violence has ended. Thus, unless 
and until war economies are dismantled, the prospects 
for durable peace remain poor.
Development agendas project roles 
onto the private sector suiting varying 
ideologies; a peacebuilding role appears 
to be the most recent projection
Many studies indicate that much investment, 
mainly in the extractive sector and large infrastruc-
ture projects, is harmful for large population groups. 
Displacement of land users, communal conflict over 
resources, and enforcement of patronage systems 
through large-scale foreign investors are most com-
mon outcomes. In war contexts, multinational com-
panies appear as drivers of sustained conflict. Con-
trasting studies assume that intensified economic 
cooperation will prevent countries from fighting 
each other, leading to the so-called liberal peace. This 
perspective informs the policies of the international 
finance institutions (IFIs), which regard the private 
sector as driver of economic growth, job creation and 
stability. Recently they have focused on promoting 
investment in FCAS, surmising that companies, out 
of self-interest, may support conflict resolution 
mechanisms and curb corruption of state officials.  
Joint action of development agencies, community or-
ganisations, SMEs, and local leaders is portrayed as 
the way towards a constructive role for companies in 
peacebuilding. Some economists argue that entrepre-
neurship itself can be a tool to facilitate peace in 
FCAS, if the right incentives are provided. These im-
ply external funding, because entrepreneurs are, by 
definition, profit-oriented. Moreover, their engage-
ment requires efforts in state-building in order to cre-
ate reliability. Balanced public and private sector de-
velopment appears to be crucial for overcoming the 
features of a war economy.
normalcy within the population and move popular 
support away from pre-war or during-conflict loyal-
ties. However, renegotiations of contract terms be-
tween project partners and privatisation of services 
sparking demonstrations of consumers are conflict 
drivers shaping the trajectory and cost structures of 
infrastructure investments. The role of external fund-
ing and the presence of aid agencies and peacekeeping 
missions for economic outcomes is significantly 
under-researched.
Entrepreneurs adjust to war economies, 
creating persisting structures that 
shape the economy long after the end 
of violent conflict
Business in war economies focuses on short-term, 
often illicit, gains. During violent conflicts, market 
competition acquires a militant dimension; armed 
actors dominate some businesses and warlords be-
come businessmen. The breakdown of legal institu-
tions and law enforcement extends business oppor-
tunities into spheres usually banned by law, in the 
domestic realm as well as to routes and networks for 
cross-border trade. Competitiveness depends on the 
ability of entrepreneurs to adjust to the violence- 
driven context, mainly through special relationships 
with powerful groups and networks of persons that 
can be trusted. Hence, businesses including small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) are part of the con-
flict context. The continuous presence of extractive 
industries, agribusinesses, distributors, and security 
services demonstrates that formal market actors con-
tinue investing in FCAS environments. This often 
involves paying private security companies for pro-
tecting sites or transport routes, which can be a sub-
stantial cost factor. SMEs manage risks mainly through 
activities providing subsistence. Most business people 
are aware of the cost of conflict, and avoiding them is 
an important motivating factor for them to strive for 
peace. Nevertheless, the practices of entrepreneurs 
during violent conflict and the structures emerging 
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sufficiently in the context of FCAS. Existing literature 
just assumes the counterfactual, that employment 
creation will promote stability. Based on this, main-
stream development studies insist on an employment- 
peace nexus and agencies have developed intuitive 
economic policies geared towards more employment 
opportunities for the jobless. These policies aim to  
reduce the likelihood that individuals will engage in 
violent activities because of the higher opportunity 
cost involved. Employment is assumed to moderate 
grievances, extend the range of livelihood options, 
create social capital, and if social services are added, 
to increase the tax base and enhance state legitimacy. 
Short, medium and long-term employment schemes 
need to run simultaneously for peace to be achieved 
and maintained. Open questions are which type of 
employment, if in the public or private sector has 
which effect on sustainable peace in which country 
context at which particular time, and if and under 
which conditions social policies are even more rele-
vant than economic policies. Little research explores 
the micro-level or is evidence based. Much less stud-
ied are the effects of violence on employment.
Employment programmes in FCAS pro-
vide low-paid short-term jobs and lack 
long-term future perspectives for the 
youth, thus fostering frustration and 
migration
Military service and participation in non-state 
armed groups interrupt human capital accumulation, 
which affects large parts of the youth in FCAS. Another 
high proportion migrates. PSD programmes in FCAS 
employ skilled foreign labour rather than providing 
local jobs for local population groups. In the absence 
of a functioning state, development agencies provide 
‘cash-for-work’, ‘food-for-work’, or ‘cash-transfer’ pro-
grammes and short-term skills trainings. Development 
agencies increasingly cooperate with private compa-
nies in employment creation, trying to integrate in-
centive structures for the private sector in recon-
struction and peacebuilding strategies. Criticising 
this competitive market-led approach, political econ-
omists hold that international and local 
SMEs are deeply entangled in the polit-
ical economy created during the violent 
conflict, which raises doubts on their 
assumed peacebuilding potential;  
theories of change in FCAS are lacking
Most SMEs are part of informal economies, which 
maintain a considerable degree of self-organisation 
and regulations in FCAS, emanating from non-state 
actors and informal institutions. State engagement 
with the informal economy is complex and often en-
tails negotiated arrangements over taxation or regu-
latory policies. State officials may pursue informal 
economic activities themselves, having vested inter-
ests in maintaining the informal economy. In FCAS, 
social legitimacy attributed to economic activities 
and the relative power of particular groups determines 
what is considered legal and illegal, not the govern-
ment or state authorities. In this context, interna-
tional organisations, sometimes in cooperation with 
local governments, have addressed business con-
straints and built capacities of informal SMEs with 
the aim to increase employment. Such projects failed 
as soon as the supporting programmes and organisa-
tions were withdrawn. Since enforcement of property 
and contract rights depends on trusted institutions, 
established local business networks may become 
crucial for re-constructing institutions after the end 
of violent conflict. In the economic literature, little 
evidence exists on the role of SMEs during ongoing 
conflicts, and no studies examine the effects on SMEs 
when international aid and foreign investment de-
cline. There is a need for theories of change in SME de-
velopment that do justice to the complexities in FCAS.
Employment policies in FCAS are based 
on unproven assumptions about an 
employment–peace nexus; insights 
from micro-level studies are missing
There is much evidence that employment is a key 
determinant of poverty reduction and that unem-
ployment is a driver of instability. However, the role 
of employment for peace has not been examined 
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donors and civil society actors as well as trainings in 
doing business in FCAS are recommended, measures 
that should be accompanied by policy dialogue of in-
ternational agencies with the government and the 
business community. 
Conflict-sensitive employment  
requires equal commitment of private 
companies and government; it opens 
up a new field of micro-level research
Conflict-sensitive employment calls for employ-
ment practices that do not cause or exacerbate con-
flict. This demand not only relates to employers, but 
also governments and states. Company contributions 
to conflict-sensitive employment can involve par-
ticular employment practices, among them labour re-
cruitment practices that are sensitive to local conflict 
dynamics and contexts, providing opportunities for 
training, decent wage levels and humane labour con-
ditions. Hence, conflict-sensitive employment focus-
es on meaningful job creation providing future pros-
pects. Moreover, employment needs to avoid divisive 
effects with the potential to create conflicts. More im-
portant than private sector employers are govern-
ment policies and, in particular, the ministries in 
charge, among them those which themselves are pro-
viding employment or operating with contractors. 
Decent work, and even more so, conflict-sensitive em-
ployment, requires rules and regulations by the state. 
However, because of the high proportion of employ-
ment in the informal sector, companies and employ-
ers in informal economies also have an important 
role to play in creating conditions for conflict-sensi-
tive employment. Many questions remain about how 
conflict-sensitive employment can be introduced in 
FCAS and, in particular, in the informal economies 
prevailing in FCAS.
entrepreneurs benefit, whereas local workers are ex-
ploited. The youth, which often had generated an in-
come or worked as security providers during the 
armed conflict, loses its livelihood and may join crim-
inal gangs or the informal sector. Bureaucracy ham-
pers formal employment, creating a range of special 
target groups such as internally displaced persons, 
refugees, returnees, women, and youth, for which de-
velopment agencies tailor special programmes. Em-
ployment concentrates on precarious jobs in agricul-
ture, services, retail and construction, but not in 
industry and value-added production. Low-paid work-
ers and large aid-dependent groups are the result, fos-
tering frustration and migration. There is no effort to 
establish socio-economic rights for disadvantaged so-
cial classes.
Conflict-sensitive private sector devel-
opment (PSD) requires awareness of 
the role of entrepreneurs, local and  
international stakeholders in the vio-
lent conflict and in FCAS
Conflict sensitivity requires the ability to under-
stand the context of intervention, including inter- 
group tensions, divisive factors and potentials to con-
nect groups across conflict lines. Where economic 
grievances are among the major causes of conflict, 
economic development with private sector involve-
ment can have great potential. However, foreign and, 
even more so, domestic businesses operating in con-
texts of fragility and conflict tend to be inherently 
part of the political marketplace, besides local stake-
holders and development actors. Entrepreneurs and 
employees will never be perceived as neutral in the 
highly political contexts of FCAS. Development agen-
cies have produced guidebooks outlining PSD tools 
for FCAS, cautioning that a conflict-sensitivity ap-
proach requires programming relevant to the specific 
conflict. Cost-benefit analyses demonstrating the fi-
nancial returns on investment in conflict-sensitive 
business strategies, learning from business impact 
assessments, and collaboration between businesses, 
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by violent conflict. This Paper sets out to elaborate 
how conflict-sensitive approaches can inform inves-
tors and companies. The guiding questions are: 
   \ How can private companies implement  
conflict-sensitive business practices? 
   \ How can conflict sensitivity be applied to 
employment? 
The remaining part of this introduction highlights 
the research field in three steps. Firstly, it introduces 
important global compacts and efforts to agree on 
standards, in order to clarify what conflict-sensitive 
business involves in practice. Secondly, it explains the 
meaning of fragile and conflict-affected settings 
(FCAS). Thirdly, it looks at the contradictions and di-
lemmas arising from the request to implement con-
flict sensitivity for businesses and, in particular, to 
strive for conflict-sensitive employment, in a setting 
of violent conflict and fragility. The introduction ends 
with an outline of the chapters of this Working Paper.
Applying conflict sensitivity to the  
private sector of the economy
Although conflict sensitivity originated in the 
humanitarian field, it has been applied in a wide 
range of development, peacebuilding and state-build-
ing contexts, as well as in private sector development 
(PSD) (Haider, 2014) and infrastructure development 
(Mashatt et al., 2008). Since the 1990s, various initia-
tives have emerged that address, to some extent, the 
need for businesses to be conflict sensitive in FCAS. 
Some of the initiatives focus on the extractive indus-
tries because these are particularly conflict-prone 
(see Annex for list of initiatives). In general, the focus 
of the initiatives is on business practices, recom-
mending that companies make transparent the ori-
gin of resources, their operations and supply chains. 
In some cases, the initiatives also include prevention 
of corruption and implementation of human rights 
and transparency standards, issues which require 
government involvement. With more than 8,000 
companies and 4,000 non-business members, the 
United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) is the largest 
initiative aimed at fostering responsible and sustain-
able business (UNGC, 2016).
The concept of ‘conflict sensitivity’ originates 
from development and humanitarian actors, triggered 
by the genocide in Rwanda. This tragedy led to the  
realisation that humanitarian and development  
actors had contributed to increased tensions and ex-
acerbated the conflict. Aid interventions have since 
been understood to be a part of the context – and in 
conflict settings, to be a part of the conflict. Subse-
quently, the framework set out in ‘Do No Harm’  
(Anderson, 1999) was integrated into ethical guide-
lines for aid agencies, and the acknowledgement that 
aid is not neutral led to the recognition that donors 
need to consider the possible inadvertent side-effects 
of programming on conflict (Haider, 2014).
From these roots, ‘conflict sensitivity’ emerged as 
a concept and tool to help actors understand the un-
intended consequences of aid, to minimise harm and 
to achieve positive outcomes. In 2008, a group of 35 
humanitarian, development and peacebuilding agen-
cies joined together and established the Conflict Sen-
sitivity Consortium, which produced a guide for in-
tervention in societies affected by violent conflict. 
Accordingly, a conflict analysis should precede any 
intervention in order to understand the background, 
history, causes and groups involved in the conflict as 
well as these groups’ different perspectives. Conflict 
sensitivity involves “(t)he ability of an organisation 
to: 1) understand the context it operates in, (2) under-
stand the interaction between its intervention and 
that context and (3) act upon this understanding in 
order to minimise negative impacts and maximise 
positive impacts on conflict” (Conflict Sensitivity 
Consortium, 2012). Even more pronounced, Saferworld 
has defined conflict sensitivity for any organisations 
operating in conflict environments as “understand-
ing the context they operate in, especially the conflict 
dynamics; understanding the nature of their engage-
ment and how this affects the conflict context, and 
vice-versa; acting on this understanding to avoid re-
inforcing conflict dynamics and to capitalise on op-
portunities to support peace” (Saferworld, 2016).
This definition makes it possible to extend the 
concept beyond the field of aid and development in-
terventions and to apply conflict sensitivity to eco-
nomic organisations operating in societies affected 
Introduction
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The process of negotiations towards reaching 
agreements on business standards, usually between 
companies, governments, civil society organisations 
and international agencies, has been lengthy, and im-
plementation has been slow, with many setbacks.  
Engagement by governments and intergovernmental 
agencies is generally an inherent part of the initia-
tives aimed at conflict-sensitive business, because 
governments and international agencies are consid-
ered to be the main guarantors of peace and security, 
as well as human rights. For example, the Guiding 
Principle on Business and Human Rights No. 7 of the 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner (UNHROHC) requires that states sup-
port business respect for human rights in conflict-af-
fected areas, among other things, by “ensuring that  
their  current  policies, legislation, regulations  and 
enforcement  measures  are  effective in addressing  
the risk of business involvement in gross human 
rights abuses” (UNHROHC, 2011, p. 9). However, for 
many governments, in particular in FCAS, it has been 
difficult to enforce standards, either due to lack of ad-
ministrative and law enforcement capacities, lack of 
financial incentives or lack of political will. When it 
emerged that government participation in some 
states and that of intergovernmental organisations 
remained low, the UNGC recognised that conflict- 
sensitive business practices could not progress with-
out practical public policy assistance to companies 
and demanded concerted engagement by public policy 
actors (Ballentine and Haufler, 2009).
The initiatives aimed at conflict-sensitive busi-
ness consider conflict in mainly two ways: as an en-
vironment in which products generated in undesira-
ble ways get into trade and international markets; 
and as a (potential) outcome of strategies of compa-
nies or investors striving at resource exploitation 
without caring for social and environmental damag-
es. The initiatives have generated agreements about 
monitoring procedures for the processes of produc-
tion, trade and export. In parallel, and in response to 
these initiatives, international non-governmental or-
ganisations (INGOs) and think tanks have conducted 
numerous studies and social impact analyses, some-
times adding environmental impact analyses. 
Looking at the issue of entanglements between war-
lords and companies, or between state officials, politi-
cians and companies for self-enrichment and 
rent-seeking, they highlight how this can contribute 
to greater social inequality, corruption, favouritism 
and exclusion. In particular, in mining and extractive 
industries, practices may be exacerbating poverty, 
among other things, through displacement, deforest-
ation or pollution, through marginalisation of some 
communities while others benefit, through the 
crowding out of small local miners or suppliers, or 
through cronyism with local councillors. This in turn 
may have the potential to create or enhance social 
conflict and increased violence (see, among many 
others, Lenfant & Traoré, 2015). The reasoning is that 
if investment or company practices have adverse  
socio-economic impacts, the latter may lead to con-
flicts that could turn violent, or they may have divi-
sive effects enhancing already ongoing violent 
conflicts. 
On the other hand, for most companies, it is a 
challenge to combine ambitious standards with the 
need for competition with large international com-
panies and profit orientation, which are the precon-
ditions for thriving in international markets. For ob-
vious reasons, in contexts of protracted violent 
conflict and related war economies, it will be difficult 
for companies to apply standards of conflict-sensitive 
business behaviour. According to the World Develop-
ment Report 2013, companies claimed that political 
instability, corruption and the lack of finance were 
major constraints, and that they had to employ costly 
measures such as private security guards and paying 
bribes in contexts of violent conflict or its aftermath 
(World Bank, 2012, p. 195). Hence, beyond the dilemma 
between the profit-making interest and decent prac-
tices, companies have to face many more and contra-
dictory challenges when conflict takes on multiple 
dimensions. At the same time, it can be in their own 
interest to continue business in local environments 
during conflict. How companies address grievances 
and seek to build trust with relevant groups in FCAS 
is an important part of the argument presented in 
this Paper. 
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Within such a context, local social orders, includ-
ing particular justice systems and institutions, may 
grow into competing political power centres, compli-
cating the establishment of a functioning central 
state that extends fully into the peripheries and holds 
the monopoly of violence (Migdal, 1994). 3 Moreover, 
state officials and politicians often pursue particular-
istic interests and do not have the political will to es-
tablish state institutions functioning to the benefit of 
the majority of the population. Accordingly, public le-
gitimacy tends to be low. Under these conditions, ex-
ternal political and economic forces will use the op-
portunity to gain a strong influence on certain 
groups in the country, within or outside the govern-
ment, further enhancing “instability and insecurity 
within these settings” (NIMD, 2016). Hence, the  
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 
(NIMD) defines fragile settings as follows: 
Fragile settings are characterised by low social cohe-
sion, and a lack of consensus on what organising 
principles should determine the contest for state 
power and how that power should be implemented. 
(NIMD, 2016)
Whereas this definition points to distrust and so-
cial divisions focusing on the national level, the same 
characteristics frequently expand across borders into 
the larger region during or after long-term violent 
conflict (Grawert, 2010, pp. 242–245). This also pertains 
to war economies, which may comprise local, national 
and frequently regional or even international markets. 
Violent conflict or its aftermath and fragility are 
closely interconnected therefore, and have to be con-
sidered as mutually reinforcing phenomena (NIMD, 
2016). This is the given context within which the lit-
erature related to conflict-sensitive business practic-
es and behaviour and, in particular, conflict-sensitive 
employment will be discussed in this Paper.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 \  For Afghanistan, see Wilde & Mielke, 2015.
 The meaning of fragile  
and conflict-affected settings (FCAS)
FCAS are defined as “settings, in which the politi-
cal environment is extremely polarised and divided 
due to a lack of trust among political actors” (NIMD, 
2016). Others use similar terms, such as “countries  
affected by fragility, conflict and violence” (World 
Bank, 2016b) or “fragile and conflict-affected states” 
(OECD, 2010; Taylor, 2014). However, the Dutch re-
search funding agency of the Netherlands Organisa-
tion for Scientific Research and its science division 
and other agencies linked to the Dutch foreign min-
istry prefer to study ‘settings’ instead of states or coun-
tries, because “fragile and conflict-affected contexts 
often coincide with state borders but may also per-
tain to specific areas within a state, or to regions en-
compassing the borders of several states” (NIMD, 
2016). This less state-centred version of the term FCAS 
is adopted here due to the following considerations.
The legacies of violent conflict tend to shape soci-
eties for a long time after the end of the conflict, fre-
quently surfacing as renewed violence, triggered by 
power struggles at national, local or even regional lev-
els, and involving neighbouring societies. Govern-
ment, administration and political representatives 
are often entangled with individuals who have been 
powerful leaders in the violent conflict, or the politi-
cians and government officials themselves may have 
been leaders in the armed conflict before. This has 
been a major reason why building institutions with 
the capacity to promote peaceful negotiations of so-
cial conflicts in the aftermath of protracted violence 
rarely has been sustainable and successful, but is 
usually a lengthy process and faces repeated setbacks.1 
When violence ceases, even when there are prospects 
for a political transformation, the organisation of so-
ciety usually continues along the lines in which com-
munities and local leaders have developed under the 
conditions of armed conflict (Latham et al., 2001). 2  
 
 
1 \  For Afghanistan, see Giustozzi, 2015; for Sudan and South Sudan, see 
Grawert, 2013; for the Horn of Africa, see de Waal, 2015..
2 \  For Afghanistan, see several papers in Goodhand & Sedra, 2015.
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The Paper aims to shed more light on these chal-
lenges and seeks to verify if these really are the given 
conditions, and if there have been attempts covered 
in the pertinent literature to overcome the dilemmas 
created by these conditions. It begins by looking at 
studies on how private companies can affect and, on 
the other hand, be affected by armed conflict, espe-
cially under conditions of protracted violence and in 
FCAS (chapter 2). This is followed by a review of aca-
demic literature and reports of development agencies 
attempting to substantiate a role for the private sec-
tor in peacebuilding and related policy initiatives 
(chapter 3). The Paper then focuses on employment 
in FCAS and the assumed employment–peace nexus. 
It examines policy papers and recommendations for 
conflict-sensitive business practices and employ-
ment, applying a critical perspective in light of the 
previous analysis (chapter 4). The conclusion high-
lights the insights as well as the research gaps identi-
fied, providing pointers for future research. 
Dilemmas of implementing conflict- 
sensitive business and employment 
in FCAS
The previous sections reveal four highly different 
perspectives, which in combination lead to contra-
dictions or dilemmas that seem irresolvable. 
1\ The required ability of the state in establishing a 
framework for conflict-sensitive business 
practices and employment is contradicted by the 
fact that, by definition, states in FCAS are weak in 
performing their expected functions, officials are 
eager to reap benefits from companies for self-en-
richment, enforcement of law and regulations is 
haphazard, and law enforcers are prone to abu-
sing power for collecting extra fees and bribes.
2\ Frameworks initiated by transnational actors and 
global regulatory conventions – aimed at monito-
ring adherence to standards of conflict-sensitive 
business behaviour in FCAS or at developing a 
particular role for the private sector in peacebuil-
ding – may end up in a vicious circle due to the 
inherent premise of a strong state as dedicated 
implementer or as the provider of an enabling 
environment.
3\ Investors and companies venturing into business 
in the risky FCAS, where violence is rampant and 
armed conflict remains unresolved, are likely to 
implement conflict-sensitive employment when 
they get tangible benefits from it, but not if this 
involves extra costs and endangers the profitabi-
lity of the enterprise.
4\ Workers may be attracted to civilian employment 
if wages and working conditions are competitive, 
or if employment offers a promising future per-
spective. Competing offers are usually recruit-
ment into armed groups for better payment than 
in the civilian realm, engagement in risky but 
well-paying endeavours such as drug dealing, 
smuggling or trafficking, and migration to areas 
or countries with easier access to employment or 
better opportunities to generate an income. 
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Moreover, research on the relationship between 
the private sector and violent conflict tends to be 
quantitative in nature, using large-scale datasets. 
While important, the explanatory power of such ap-
proaches is by nature limited given the complexity of 
the relationship. This suggests that quantitative studies 
need to be complemented by qualitative studies. 
The micro-economic literature is even less sys-
tematic at present. Many factors appear to be adversely 
affected by civil war. Those individuals or households 
which participate in wars, or simply live through 
them, often suffer from persistent injuries, lose out 
on education, and see a permanent decline in their 
productivity and earnings. However, it remains largely 
unexplored understanding which impacts are more 
profound and persistent than others, which ones dis-
proportionately strike the poor, and how those effects 
can be contained by local institutions and economic 
policies. In fact, each of these outcomes of war has 
implications beyond the individual. To the extent 
that these costs of violent conflict are borne unequally 
across groups, conflict can intensify economic inequal-
ity as well as poverty. The destruction (and deferred 
accumulation) of both human and physical capital 
also hinders macroeconomic performance. Combined 
with the effects of war on institutions and technology, 
all these factors have an impact on national income 
growth. However, in-depth studies – particularly on 
the ways in which companies are operating in con-
flict-affected environments and the repercussions – 
are very rare. Instead, the literature covers company 
practices in ‘post-conflict’ settings, usually assuming 
that there is a transitional period after wars, during 
which the private sector is restructuring.
Most of the literature on post-conflict recovery 
comes in the form of best practice summaries, case 
studies, and reports produced by international aid 
organisations, governments and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (see, for example, MacSweeney, 
2008). Academic research remains limited and, where 
it exists, it tends to focus on high-level analysis (for 
instance, on the relationship between aggregate for-
eign aid and national economic growth). Therefore, it 
remains largely unhelpful to those seeking specific 
programmatic solutions. 
Mainstream economic science did not take much 
notice of the role of conflict in economic develop-
ment until the mid-2000s, when the study ‘Greed and 
Grievance in Civil Wars’ (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) 
reached a larger audience and was widely discussed. 
The study was a follow-up to a World Bank-sponsored 
research study, entitled ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap 
– Civil War and Development Policy’ (Collier et al., 
2003). However, only in 2011, the World Development 
Report ‘Conflict, Security and Development’ (World 
Bank, 2011) signalled that dealing with countries in 
conflict had become a part of development policy. The 
economic field of development policy thus has become 
the vanguard for studies on business in conflict set-
tings, whereas, until this day, most of the common 
economic textbooks completely ignore the problem.
The relationship between the economy, conflict 
and peace has largely been approached in either one 
of two ways, reflecting the different perspectives of 
those engaged in exploring this issue. For those con-
cerned with the socio-economic pillars of traditional 
‘development’, the focus has been on the importance 
of stimulating rapid economic growth as the most di-
rect path out of poverty. However, simply stimulating 
growth in a FCAS often characterised by structural 
injustices, horizontal and geographical inequalities, 
corruption and patronage may reinforce or reignite 
violent conflict. For conflict specialists, attention has 
been focused on war economies and the economic 
drivers of conflict more broadly, emphasising the po-
tentially destructive consequences of shadow econo-
mies, elite capture of natural resource revenues, and 
illicit trade in people, weapons and drugs (Banfield et 
al., 2006).
The works of Collier et al., the World Develop-
ment Report 2011 and many subsequent studies only 
consider the macro-level (national economies, sec-
tors), and not the micro-level (individuals, house-
holds, firms). Furthermore, the bulk of studies focus 
on how best to deal with the effects of conflicts, rath-
er than explaining the causes, nature and dynamics 
of conflicts. On the other hand, there are more stud-
ies on the effects of employment and private sector 
programmes on violence (see, for example, Walton, 
2010) than on the prior effects of violence on firms 
and employment, which is the focus here.
The private sector in FCAS
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Nevertheless, this Paper attempts to outline the 
main findings of the available studies to help achieve 
a better understanding of the relationship between 
violent conflict and private business. The first section 
of this chapter discusses the literature on the effects 
of violent conflicts on the economy. Section two pro-
vides a review of the literature reflecting on the role 
of companies and businesses in civil wars and armed 
conflicts. 
 
Effects of violent conflict on the private 
sector and trajectories of recovery
There are different forms of violent conflict—inter- 
state war, civil war, terrorism, coups, communal vio-
lence, political repression, crime – and the distinctions 
between them are not always clear. They are often 
overlapping. In the field of economics, however, the 
discussion concentrates on civil war. One main focus 
of economists is on the effect of violent conflict on 
national incomes and government revenues. According 
to such macro-analysis, the main reason why the 
poorest countries have failed to catch up with the 
middle-income and rich countries is their much 
greater likelihood of being involved in wars and civil 
conflicts. This factor alone accounts for an income 
loss of about 40 per cent over 20 years (Milanovic, 
2005). War directly reduces production and causes a 
gradual loss of the capital stock due to destruction, 
dissaving and the substitution of portfolios abroad. 
During civil wars, the gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita tends to decline at an annual rate of 2.2 per 
cent relative to its counterfactual. The decline affects 
sectors differentially. Sectors that are intensive in 
capital and transactions (manufacturing), as well as 
sectors that supply capital (construction) and trans-
actions (transport, distribution and finance), contract 
more rapidly than the GDP as a whole. The sector 
with the opposite characteristics (arable subsistence 
agriculture) expands relative to GDP (Collier, 1999). 
In her background paper for the World Develop-
ment Report 2011, Peschka (2011) lists the following as 
constraints for private sector development following 
a period of violent conflict: asset destruction, macroe-
conomic instability, poor public institutions, 
corruption, insecurity, limited access to finance, low 
access to labour, insecure land ownership, damage to 
infrastructure, market distortions, and poor tax en-
forcement and collection. Blattman & Miguel (2010) 
highlight that violent conflicts lead to the interruption 
of production and trade, massive capital flight and 
the destruction of physical capital. Workers and  
entrepreneurs, the human capital, are maimed, killed 
or compelled to flee. Infrastructure for education and 
healthcare is destroyed. The crucial questions for  
understanding war’s impacts on economic growth 
and inequality, as well as priorities for post-conflict 
assistance, are in which ways, how much, for whom 
and how persistently human capital is affected.  
According to Blattman & Miguel (2010), no rigorous 
evidence yet exists on which types of programmes 
are most effective at overcoming war’s adverse legacies 
on human capital.
Authors have pointed out that, in conflict-affected 
countries, transaction costs are extremely high. Trade 
and business activities are seriously limited, which 
prevents employment growth. A growing body of em-
pirical literature estimates the magnitude of these 
effects of war on post-war income, poverty, wealth, 
health and education (Collier et al., 2003; Blattman & 
Miguel, 2010; Peschka, 2011). According to Collier 
(1999), the restoration of peace does not necessarily 
produce a dividend, because peace neither recreates 
the fiscal nor the risk characteristics of the pre-war 
economy; there is a higher burden of military ex-
penditure and a greater risk of renewed war (Collier, 
1999). 
While the destructive consequences of armed 
conflict are great, warfare is also credited with the 
technological and institutional development that un-
derpins Western economic prosperity (North et al., 
2009). War has enabled the development of capable 
government institutions in Europe after World War II. 
However, the United Nations Development Programme’s 
(UNDP) ‘Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report’ points 
to the tremendous funding initiative envisaged under 
the US Marshall Plan, which had not intended to re-
store the pre-war order but aimed for a qualitatively 
different socio-economic order. The volume of aid 
provided much-needed fiscal space for Europe, 
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allowing the countries to finance the reconstruction 
of key physical infrastructure, to extend social safety 
nets, to ease shortages of basic necessities, and to relax 
price controls and rationing. Moreover, the Marshall 
Plan funds were predictable and non-conditional,  
allowing for context-specific adjustments by the ben-
eficiary governments. It contributed to enabling gov-
ernments regain some popularity and boosted confi-
dence that recovery was on track (UNDP, 2008, p. 128).
This obviously cannot be compared directly to 
the conditions of today’s post-war developing coun-
tries and does not rule out the possibility that the 
economic devastation caused by civil war prevents 
some countries from achieving durable peace. However, 
clear conclusions cannot be drawn either, because 
good data is lacking in war-torn countries where the 
economy and institutions have collapsed (such as Congo 
and Somalia), while it is available in those that recover 
(such as Vietnam) (Blattman & Miguel, 2010, p. 39). 
The neoclassical growth model based on Solow 
(1956) predicts that the capital stock will return to its 
steady state level once the fighting stops, implying 
relatively high returns and rates of investment that 
decline as the equilibrium is approached. Evidence 
from inter-state wars supports the model, suggesting 
that the post-war evolution of physical capital often 
behaves as predicted under the neoclassical model 
– that is, rapid recovery to equilibrium levels (Blattman 
& Miguel, 2010). This model presupposes that under-
lying institutions and technology are largely unaf-
fected by the fighting, and that military spending, the 
returns to capital investment and the cost of capital 
similarly will return to pre-war levels. Yet, any political 
or economic uncertainty following war is likely to  
reduce expected returns, increase relative risk and 
possibly shorten investment horizons, thus reducing 
investment and raising the cost of capital. Hence, the 
model does not respond adequately to the character-
istics of FCAS, which include the collapse of some in-
stitutions and of regulatory compliance.
UNDP (2008) emphasises that macroeconomic 
policies must give priority to minimising conflict 
risk, even as they promote growth. This may mean 
tolerating moderate inflation and budget deficits. 
Critically, recovery efforts must also promote policies 
that attract private sector investment as well as the 
return of skilled workers. In fact, the causes of war of-
ten persist during the reconstruction phase and must 
be carefully taken into account. 
Addison (2001) makes the point that the macro- 
framework for successfully re-building post-conflict 
economies requires decentralising political and eco-
nomic power, avoiding high inequality and minimising 
macroeconomic shocks. In fragile societies, the costs 
of getting policy wrong—delaying reform but also 
creating errors in designing reform itself—are much 
higher than in more secure societies (Addison, 2001). 
Similarly, Carbonnier (1998) argues that potential 
trade-offs and contradictions between economic re-
form, external assistance and peacebuilding agendas 
often are not taken into account sufficiently. Country 
specifics are important—there is no blueprint for re-
building war-torn economies. The specific circum-
stances of each country must be carefully analysed 
and the rationale behind every conflict must be prop-
erly understood. In many FCAS with reconstruction 
efforts, some of the most fundamental aspects of 
post-conflict rebuilding have been overlooked, mainly 
because they do not fit into the prevailing paradigm. 
Political stability cannot be relegated to a lower prior-
ity than, and must actually prevail over, economic  
efficiency when designing post-conflict policies  
(Carbonnier, 1998). 
Various studies emphasise the need for a strong 
state, able to accelerate economic development and 
poverty reduction, to consolidate peace, to reduce the 
scope for extreme brutality and exploitation of social 
relations, and to withstand the intrusive interests of 
regional powers (Goodhand, 2003). UNDP (2008) also 
highlights that a strong and inclusive state is essential 
to guarantee stability and recovery. The report contends 
that the state’s capacity to collect revenue and to allo-
cate it effectively is crucial and demands improved 
transparency, especially in countries rich in natural 
resources, in order to constrain the high potential for 
rent seeking from the outset (UNDP, 2008). In fact, in 
many if not most countries, the wished-for strong 
state is absent, and it is hardly feasible to build that 
state first at the expense of all other efforts seeking to 
stabilise countries, bring peace, develop economies 
and create employment. 
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Brück et al (2000) find that post-war reconstruction, 
defined as obtaining external and internal balance 
and high per capita growth, is surprisingly difficult 
to obtain even under favorable political and economic 
conditions. The legacy of war is a key constraint on 
post-war growth, especially through the damaged 
commercial network, the loss of trust and the weak-
ening of market institutions. In addition, political 
uncertainty in the post-war period inhibits private 
sector investment and significantly reduces the 
peace dividend. This is worsened by inappropriate 
stabilisation policies. The authors argue that aid poli-
cies should be modified for war and post-war econo-
mies to accelerate the reduction in foreign debt and 
to support small-scale private producers, including 
those in the countryside. Military spending does not 
fall and social spending does not rise as quickly as is 
generally expected, thus delaying a noticeable reduc-
tion in poverty. The clear sequencing but gradual im-
plementation of government reforms, especially in 
the social sectors, is important for maintaining 
entitlements.
Recent research in economics points to the high 
importance of institutions for economic development 
and also to the role of violence in this context (North 
et al., 2013). For example, Rodrik (1998) states that 
deep-rooted (more or less) latent social conflict in a 
society with weak institutions of conflict management 
will suffer relatively more from external shocks than 
societies without strong conflict. He argues from a 
macroeconomic perspective that, while societies 
without violent conflict are able to react to and over-
come external shocks, violent conflict-affected socie-
ties will in general experience more economic dam-
age, since the economic costs of the external shocks 
“are magnified by the distributional conflicts that are 
triggered” (Rodrik, 1998, p. 2). In the absence of miti-
gating institutions, suspicion between groups will  
increase and the group perception that they are not 
getting their fair share of resources will become more 
likely. Hence, in economies with weak institutions, 
the incentives to cooperate are small and the gains of 
opportunism are likely to rise. If institutions are 
strong, they can prevent opportunistic groups from 
preying on cooperating groups (Rodrik, 1998). 
According to Brück et al (2000), civil and economic 
institutions are the main victims of war, especially 
internal war. The importance of institutions in post-
war reconstruction has been underestimated, and 
they should receive priority funding by donors and 
governments to accelerate post-war growth and pov-
erty reduction. Similarly, Naudé (2007) considers 
well-functioning state institutions as a crucial pre-
condition for the successful emergence of pro-growth 
entrepreneurship. Institutions are responsible for en-
suring that governance is restored in FCAS. This en-
tails “the establishment of rules, regulations, property 
rights, contract enforcement, limiting the role of the 
state as an economic player, and lowering the costs of 
business formation” (Naudé, 2007, p. 14). However, the 
strength of institutions depends on the initial condi-
tions within a conflict society – for example, the just 
or unjust distribution of wealth. Nevertheless, the 
role of government in contributing to the creation of 
appropriate conditions for pro-growth entrepreneur-
ship and adequate support of private sector develop-
ment is considered as vital; even a ‘development state’ 
may be required in order to revamp the private sector 
(Naudé, 2007, p. 22). 
In many FCAS, formal institutions have crumbled 
during the violent conflict, and alternative structures 
of power and exchange have been created mostly out-
side the formal economy. While most literature de-
scribes this as negative (for example, Denu, 2011), a 
few authors envisage the creation of potentially posi-
tive institutional structures that can provide a basis 
for a functioning post-conflict society. Nonetheless, 
studies have produced few definitive answers on the 
effect of civil war on institutions. This may well be 
because it depends on factors such as why a war 
started in the first place, how it is fought and how it 
ends. Moreover, those authors who examine the pos-
sibilities for reconstruction end up encountering the 
dilemma between the need for well-functioning state 
institutions enabling private sector recovery and the 
typical context in FCAS, which is characterised by 
low institutional performance by the state. Much  
research is currently under way following this lead; 
however, such research has neither resolved this  
dilemma nor does it yet deal much with microeco-
nomic analysis, not to mention firms. 
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development. In the literature reviews and provider 
experiences reported by MacDonald (2005), the fol-
lowing key issues affecting infrastructure provision 
were cited:
   \ Immediate issues—such as lack of security pro-
vision and funding; 
   \ Underlying problems—such as lack of institu-
tional capacity, transparency, conflict sensitivi-
ty  and governance; 
   \ Problems of response—such as strategy and 
sector prioritisation, the roles of key stakehold-
ers, short and long-term solutions, procure-
ment and long-term financing.
Anand (2012) in a way builds on these issues,  
arguing that a coherent and coordinated reconstruc-
tion framework requires strategic planning. He 
claims that such planning needs in-depth stakeholder 
consultation to achieve legitimacy among and own-
ership by local citizens. Stakeholder consultations 
can pave the way for some degree of shared vision 
and buy-in. However, consultation is not the same as 
ownership, and stakeholders may perceive the pro-
cess as being top-down window dressing that limits 
their role to that of passive recipients rather than 
creating a real opportunity to actively participate.
These studies show that experts consider infra-
structure as fundamental for larger economic reform, 
institution building and strategic planning, which 
can be a lever to involve not only state authorities, 
but also stakeholders and citizens to enhance the  
legitimacy of post-war leaders. However, the urgent 
need to provide access to basic infrastructure services 
for populations in countries emerging from a conflict 
often faces the challenge of lack of adequate public 
revenue, government capacity and investor interest 
to re-establish these services quickly. Although donors 
often support the early phases of post-conflict recon-
struction with generous aid packages, the public sec-
tor in FCAS is often constrained by extremely weak 
absorptive capacity. At the same time, a large number 
of urgent policy priorities in the immediate post-con-
flict period means that governments rarely focus on 
establishing a welcoming investment climate that 
can spark the interest of potential private investors 
in infrastructure. 
The importance of rebuilding  
infrastructure
An important aspect in FCAS is the re-building of 
infrastructure, which usually is destroyed during civil 
war. Hence, it is a crucial area of investment in recon-
struction, often receiving public or foreign investment 
while involving private companies. Therefore, the 
emerging literature dealing with construction and 
rebuilding of infrastructure as a key necessity for 
‘post-conflict’ states is discussed in some depth here.
In a background paper for the World Development 
Report entitled ‘Attacking Poverty’ (World Bank, 2000), 
Hoeffler (1999) reviews the challenges of infrastructure 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in 12 war-affected 
economies in Africa. Her study includes the water, 
transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
and shows that the standard of infrastructure provi-
sion is very low in all of the 12 countries. She finds 
that as long as countries are not at peace and guerilla 
activities and banditry make the countries unsafe, 
private investors are unlikely to invest in infrastruc-
ture projects. Hoeffler concludes that once the coun-
tries are at peace, economic reconstruction should be 
paralleled by economic reform, because without an 
adequate legal and regulatory framework, countries 
are unlikely to attract private investment. However, 
despite their high risk rankings, some war-affected 
economies have been able to attract private investors 
– for instance, for cellular telephone networks. As the 
willingness to pay for safe water and energy tends to 
be high, the water and energy sectors could in princi-
ple be attractive to private investors as well (Hoeffler, 
1999).
MacDonald (2005), writing for the UK Department 
for International Development (DFID) on infrastruc-
ture in post-conflict situations, covers water and san-
itation, transport, shelter, communications and energy 
infrastructure sectors, as well as the reinstatement of 
public buildings. His study includes pertinent exam-
ples from both conflict and post-conflict countries. 
Accordingly, infrastructure providers face many diffi-
culties in post-conflict situations. Whereas they can 
easily identify and mitigate some of these difficulties, 
others do not become apparent until later stages of 
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Thus, for the first few years after war, states face a 
paradox – they can neither absorb fully reconstruc-
tion aid nor can they attract much private investment 
to infrastructure sectors in order to offset the state’s 
low absorptive capacity. Whereas telecommunications 
investments, particularly mobile telephony, usually 
materialise immediately after (or sometimes even  
before) the end of the conflict (Hoeffler, 1999), elec-
tricity generation and distribution projects start to 
emerge about three years after the conflict and in-
crease in frequency after five years. Private investment 
in transport and water tends to start much later. 
Within the transport sector, seaports tend to receive 
the bulk of private investment. However, the experi-
ences of a number of conflict-affected countries, such 
as the Philippines, Mozambique, El Salvador and  
Guatemala, suggest that there are possibilities for 
conflict-affected countries to speed up private invest-
ment in infrastructure through adequate policies, 
thus enhancing the contribution of the private sector 
to reconstruction processes and the resumption of 
growth (Schwartz et al., 2004).
Infrastructure development—with increasing 
contributions from the private sector—is the founda-
tion of a sustainable economy and a means to achiev-
ing broader nation-building goals. Providing basic 
services is critical to security, governance, economic 
development and social well-being. In conflict-affected 
environments, the condition of infrastructure is often 
a barometer of whether a society will slip further into 
violence or make a peaceful transition out of the con-
flict cycle. Rapid restoration of essential services, such 
as water, sanitation and electricity, encourages the 
perception of a return to normalcy and thus contrib-
utes to the peace process. Infrastructure is funda-
mental to moving popular support away from pre-
war or during-conflict loyalties and to attracting 
spoilers to post-war political objectives. These insights 
have led Mashatt et al (2008) to develop a model that 
links the infrastructure cycle with conflict analysis. 
This model is helpful to focus the attention of infra-
structure programme planners and implementers on 
the conflict cycle instead of using an engineering 
perspective, through which infrastructure experts 
tend to approach problems. While this view is also 
important, it must be linked with an appreciation of 
the conflict dynamics. Indeed, traditional engineer-
ing concerns, such as efficiency, are secondary in a 
conflict-sensitive approach (Mashatt et al., 2008).
Despite the considerable scholarship focused on 
infrastructure investment in the developing world 
and the substantial amounts of money spent each 
year on developing country infrastructure, little  
attention has been directed towards understanding 
the drivers of conflict that shape the trajectory and 
cost structures of these massive investments. Boudet 
et al (2011) highlight that the manifestation of con-
flict among stakeholders in infrastructure projects 
ranges from the renegotiation of contract terms by 
project partners to popular protests among consumers 
of privatised services. Country-level characteristics, 
such as the extent of democracy and the rate of INGO 
participation, are important elements in the levels of 
conflict related to water supply projects, but not in 
pipeline projects. Local impacts such as service price 
increases (water supply) and limited provision of oil 
and gas to the host country (pipelines) are important 
drivers of conflict for both subsectors. The involvement 
of one or more international financial institutions  
is also associated with the emergence of conflict in 
projects. Contrary to expectations, public consultation 
has been associated with conflict in both subsectors 
as well. Overall, the findings by Boudet et al (2011) 
suggest that factors associated with conflict in infra-
structure projects can be minimised through careful 
project design. This links it to the conflict analysis  
requested by Mashatt et al (2008).
Hence, foreign financial aid and other interna-
tional interventions could play an important role in 
rebuilding infrastructure and also in replenishing 
household assets after war. However, regarding the 
role of aid, there is only anecdotal evidence from 
countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia showing 
that the role of the international community was  
decisive in shifting expectations about future conflict 
risk. Some studies suggest that foreign aid might play 
a key role in solidifying the transition to peace  
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Collier et al., 2003; World 
Bank, 2011). In terms of armed interventions, economic 
outcomes are under-researched as well. Establishing 
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infrastructure, kidnapping, looting, loss of employees 
due to injury or death, emigration or joining the fight, 
insecure property rights, and decreased demand. 
These conditions increase transaction costs and the 
cost of doing business, particularly for firms directed 
towards the international market that depend heavily 
on transport and logistical infrastructure. The result 
of such challenges is that companies may move out, 
close down or adjust. 
On the other hand, some firms and entrepreneurs 
benefit from armed conflict, dealing with or produc-
ing goods used intensively in war (security services, 
alcohol) or making use of decreased market entry  
requirements that result in a lower cost of discovery 
for potentially worthwhile activities. According to 
Naudé (2007), “entrepreneurship is an ubiquitous 
quality in fragile and post-conflict states and therefore 
not lacking” because war and conflict do not prevent 
entrepreneurial ventures from emerging and thriving, 
as they fulfill “a threefold role in sourcing funds to 
sustain conflicts, overcoming the adverse impacts of 
conflict, and exploiting profitable opportunities aris-
ing from conflict” (Naudé, 2007, p. 4). Hence, “entre-
preneurship may in itself be contributing to, and con-
tributing from, the very conflict and poverty for 
which entrepreneurship is being prescribed as a pan-
acea” (Naudé, 2007, p. 1). Accordingly, as the economy 
in conflict societies develops, employment patterns 
and workers’ strategies will change as “relatively 
more people will shift into labour employment, so 
that the entrepreneurship rate (...) will fall” (Naudé, 
2007, p. 7). This will result in an increase in the aver-
age firm size, at least if it is reinforced by improve-
ments in transport and infrastructure. After a certain 
level of development is reached, self-employment 
and the amount of smaller firms will then increase 
again.
As Peschka (2011) points out, private entrepre-
neurs and hence a private sector exist in all conflict 
situations, and they have the potential to both exac-
erbate and ameliorate conflict. Far from disappearing, 
private businesses continue to operate even during 
the most violent situations. However, the nature of 
business is profoundly different from that observed 
in periods of peace: it regularly focuses on short-term, 
a causal impact of armed intervention on long-run 
political and economic outcomes is elusive, because 
variables related to both domestic and international 
political factors involved in the timing of foreign in-
terventions are likely to be omitted (Blattman & 
Miguel, 2010). Since armed interventions have become 
a growing characteristic of FCAS, more research on 
the economic effects is desirable.
As stated at the beginning of this section, the 
bulk of the literature considers the macroeconomic 
level and does not link the insights to the level of 
firms and companies, households, employees, 
job-seekers and their decisions. The next section tries 
to shed more light on this aspect.
The role of entrepreneurs in violent 
conflict settings
Entrepreneurs have been defined as “people who 
create and manage a firm and who are therefore clas-
sified as either being self-employed or earning income 
from a small business” (Brück et al., 2013, p. 2). Beyond 
this descriptive definition, entrepreneurs have been 
characterised as being innovative and acting towards 
creatively destroying the market equilibrium by mak-
ing use of incomplete market information for the 
benefit of their business. Among other things, this  
involves an attitude of facing and overcoming chal-
lenges, assessing and taking risks, adapting to different 
conditions and showing resilience (drawn from 
Springer Gabler, no year). These are also some of the 
characteristics of ‘entrepreneurship’ – that is, the 
strategies and forms of organisation that entrepre-
neurs use to successfully establish a business. Hence, 
entrepreneurs are “persons who are ingenious and 
creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, 
power and prestige” (Baumol, 1990, p. 987; see also 
Brück et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs comprise owners or 
managers of large, medium, small and micro-enter-
prises, which use opportunities to profitably establish 
themselves in a market.
Violent conflict can affect entrepreneurship in 
both negative and positive ways, as indicated by the 
literature reviewed by Brück et al (2011). FCAS can af-
fect firms through diminished security, destroyed 
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trade across borders. Competitiveness depends on the 
ability of entrepreneurs to adjust to the violence- 
driven context. This usually implies building special 
relationships with powerful groups and relying on 
networks of persons that can be trusted. Frequently, 
these networks comprise family members, kin and 
members of the same ethnic or other common identi-
ty groups. Accordingly, the relationship between the 
private sector and conflict depends on a multitude of 
factors, ranging from individual leadership to the na-
ture and structure of the society in which private 
business is operating. Focusing on local business,  
Killick et al (2005) state that, while there are clear dif-
ferences in size and type, local businesses are by defi-
nition part of the existing conflict context.
Whether or not firm owners benefit or lose from 
violent conflict depends on the characteristics of 
their entrepreneurial activity and their relation to 
the conflict environment. Decisive factors include 
the lootability of the produced or traded goods, the 
proximity to urban centres, the use of resources easily 
controllable by the armed forces, and the capability 
to diversify and adapt rapidly the whole supply chain 
according to a moving frontline. Conflict puts a pre-
mium on creativity. While it stretches a firm’s ability 
to remain in business, it may also offer new opportu-
nities (Brück et al., 2011).
Armed violence in FCAS is just one of a whole  
series of factors that define business decisions. As  
regards investment in conflict countries, company 
attitudes have been found to depend on four principal 
factors (Wennmann, 2012):
   \ Magnitude of physical assets in specific vio-
lence-affected areas, for example, large-scale 
site-specific investments in non-movable assets 
such as roads, buildings, production chain; 
   \ Core business of the enterprise, for example, 
natural resource exploitation, services, con-
struction or transportation; 
   \ Strategy behind the investment, for example, 
outputs that are produced for foreign or 
domestic markets, or the use of integrated 
production cycles;  
   \ Level of exit costs—defined as the balance  
between fixed and mobile assets. 
often illicit, gains. Frequently, actors fuse—such as 
warlords or military officers who become businessmen 
(Peschka, 2011). This indicates that entrepreneurs try 
to overcome bottlenecks resulting from the destruc-
tion of physical infrastructure and the flight of local 
human and financial capital by making adjustments 
to changed market conditions. Moreover, market 
competition acquires a militant dimension so that 
armed actors dominate some businesses (Le Billion, 
2005; Schlichte, 2009; Zuhur, 2016). In peace and con-
flict research, the notion of war economies has been 
developed, which describes the typical forms of busi-
ness and entrepreneurship (see Box 1).
   \  (War economies) “involve the destruction or circumvention of 
the formal economy and the growth of informal and black 
markets, effectively blurring the lines between the formal,  
informal and criminal sectors and activities;
   \  Pillage, predation, extortion, and deliberate violence against 
civilians is used by combatants to acquire control over lucrative 
assets, capture trade networks and diaspora remittances and 
exploit labour;
   \  War economies are highly decentralised and privatised, both 
in the means of coercion and in the means of production and 
exchange;
   \  Combatants increasingly rely on the licit or illicit exploitation 
of/trade in lucrative natural resources where these assets 
obtain; 
   \  They thrive on cross-border trading networks, regional kin and 
ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as 
legally operating commercial entities, each of which may have 
a vested interest in the continuation of conflict and instability”
(Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005, p. 2)
The activities outlined in Box 1 show that the 
breakdown of legal structures and law enforcement 
extends business opportunities into spheres that are 
usually banned by law. Whereas some groups and in-
dividuals take direct advantage of the power of arms 
to seize property and money, raise dues, use forced  
labour and control trade as well as assets and natural 
resources, others thrive in the war economy, organis-
ing supplies by establishing routes and networks for 
Box 1  
Features of war economies
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limited capacity to absorb shocks, whereas larger 
companies are more likely to overcome problems 
such as lack of infrastructure in FCAS by developing 
their own facilities (GIZ, 2015). Davis & Balt (2014) 
identify four phases in company decision-making 
processes, highlighting in particular how companies 
tend to analyse risks in fragile contexts: 
   \ Commercial analysis;
   \ Physical security risk;
   \ Risks associated with political, ethical and  
societal issues;
   \ Mitigation, management and minimisation of 
risks (see Box 1).
Figure 1 shows that, from the perspective of en-
trepreneurs, political risks including the risks con-
nected to violent conflict are just another risk among 
those facing businesses every day. Therefore, conflict 
is not always an impediment to business. However, 
the majority of businesses stand to gain from lasting 
peace and are aware of the cost of conflict to the 
Based on these factors, companies may decide to 
work in situations of armed violence and attempt to 
minimise the effect of armed violence on their opera-
tions and activities. The presence of extractive indus-
tries, agribusinesses, distributors, security services 
and other legitimate businesses demonstrates that 
some formal market actors are interested in investing 
in FCAS environments and have found ways to manage 
risks in these sectors. For bigger companies, this may 
involve paying private security companies for protec-
tion of their sites or transport routes, which can be a 
substantial cost factor in some contexts. Small entre-
preneurs may manage risks in FCAS through activities 
providing subsistence or illicit production or trade 
(Hameed & Mixon, 2013).
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) di-
verge significantly from larger enterprises regarding 
their different ability to deal with risk. Some studies 
emphasise that SMEs are vulnerable to the economic 
and political environment of FCAS because they have 
Figure 1  
Four phases in company decision-making processes
Source: P. Davis, Boardrooms and bombs II: Strategies of multinational companies in conflict areas, Geneva: PeaceNexus Foundation, 2012, p.18
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would make it possible to set SMEs in relation to the 
overall economy so that their relative weight can be 
assessed appropriately.
It is widely agreed that the core characteristics of 
SMEs are their critical role in any country’s economy, 
be it through job creation, entrepreneurship or income 
generation. SMEs are often more labour intensive 
than larger firms and, hence, employ more labour. 
Employees often work with informal arrangements 
and tend to have insecure livelihoods, with unstable 
and inadequate earnings and low productivity (Pain 
& Mallet, 2014, p. 1). Typically, SMEs have strong link-
ages to other activities, thus stimulating the national 
economy. They use more local inputs and are less im-
port dependent than large enterprises. They produce 
for lower-income markets and are widely geographi-
cally dispersed, two factors which are positive for  
national development. SMEs are also commended for 
their ability to innovate and for their flexibility. 
Moreover, their role as a training ground for entrepre-
neurs has been widely recognised. Biggs & Shah 
(2006) emphasise that SMEs may circumvent market 
failures and lacking formal institutions by creating 
private governance systems in the form of long-term 
business relationships and tight, ethnically-based 
business networks. Trust building hence is an impor-
tant aspect of functioning networks involving SMEs.
private sector. Avoiding these costs is an important 
motivating factor for business people, particularly for 
larger companies, which are able to take on risks stra-
tegically. Smaller businesses are more likely to have 
no choice and to focus solely on survival (Hettiarachchi, 
Holdaway, & Gündüz, 2009, p. 193). 
Since, in most FCAS, there is a greater predomi-
nance of SMEs than larger companies, the subsequent 
sections focus on the conditions for SMEs in FCAS in 
particular.
Small and medium-sized enterprises 
in FCAS
In most countries, SMEs form the most impor-
tant sub-sector of the private sector. They are different 
from micro-enterprises, which usually only consist of 
the employer, have no employees, often operate part 
time, and have no intention or business plans aimed 
at growing and gaining significant market shares 
(Gibson & van der Vaart, 2008, p. 28). It is undisputed 
that SMEs constitute a large part of the economy in 
developing economies. Legally registered enterprises 
exist alongside informal enterprises and activities. 
However, what defines a SME is not universally 
agreed upon. Thus, definitions tend to be based 
around the number of employees, assets and revenue, 
although there is debate over what the precise defini-
tion is (see below).
The Brookings Institute argues that SMEs should 
have meaningful definitions, based on their functional 
and behavioural attributes rather than quantifica-
tions. Since this appears to be impossible, a definition 
that takes into account the local context of a country 
may be the second-best solution, such as the follow-
ing: “An SME is a formal enterprise with annual turn-
over, in US dollar terms, of between 10 and 1,000 
times the mean per capita gross national income, at 
purchasing power parity, of the country in which it 
operates” (Gibson & van der Vaart, 2008, p. 18). This 
definition can be used “as a flexible guide or starting 
point in determining the most appropriate definition 
of SMEs to be applied to any given programme or 
project” (Gibson & van der Vaart, 2008, p. 27), especially 
if it is adjusted to subnational regions to accommo-
date for economic disparities within countries. This 
Table 1  
SME defintions used by mulitlateral institutions
Institution No. of 
employees*
Revenue or 
turnover*,**
Assets** 
World Bank 300 15,000,000 15,000,000
Mulitlateral Invest-
ment Fund (IDB)
100 3,000,000 none
African Development 
Bank
50 none none
Asian Development 
Bank
No official definition, uses definitions of national governments
UNDP 200 none none
Notes: *Maximum number; **in US dollars
Source: Gibson & van der Vaart, 2008, p. 5
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However, among economists, it is disputed 
whether a focus on SME promotion by policymakers 
is advisable, because there is no evidence that small 
and micro-enterprises can drive growth in developing 
countries. On the other hand, knowledge-based inno-
vation is much more likely to happen in smaller and 
hence more flexible firms (Naudé, 2007, pp. 5–6). More-
over, there is evidence that SMEs are less affected 
than larger businesses by the general economic un-
certainty, imperfect information and high transaction 
costs prevailing in FCAS. Informal and small surviv-
alist firms predominate under such conditions, with 
employment patterns determined by the coexistence 
of a multitude of small and micro-enterprises that 
are created out of mere necessity. However, those ven-
tures are hardly profit maximising, but rather seek to 
keep the risks low (Naudé, 2007, pp. 5–7). 
This brief overview indicates that the micro- 
economic literature only scratches the surface of the 
range of possible civil war impacts on the economy 
and employment. Evidence on the educational, em-
ployment and health impacts of conflict on armed 
group participants and civilians, including internally 
displaced people, is scarce. Whereas the potential of 
SMEs for economic and social development is covered 
extensively in the literature, little evidence exists on 
the role of SMEs during ongoing conflicts. No atten-
tion seems to have been paid to the effects on and 
role of private enterprises in phases when interna-
tional aid and foreign investment start to decline, 
usually some years after the formal end of a violent 
conflict. Similarly, there seems to be little or no 
knowledge about the relative performance of domestic 
firms that are cooperating with foreign companies or 
other actors. 
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in the ‘Second Treatise’ of John Locke (1689), the 
‘Principles of Political Economy’ of John Stuart Mill 
(1848) and later Howard V. Perlmutter (1969). Friedman 
(1990) pursues the same line of economic thought, 
holding that a global supply chain will contribute to 
peace, because those countries involved would not 
fight each other in order to safeguard their economic 
interests. 
The policy goals of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have pursued this 
ideology through economic liberalisation programmes. 
The Washington Consensus of 1990 and the direct 
financial support of private investors through the 
World Bank Group sought to create an enabling envi-
ronment for the private sector. The policies of the IFIs 
in general seek to open up more space for the private 
sector and to close the space for the public sector. The 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of 
the World Bank Group, invests in FCAS, funds compa-
nies that employ ex-combatants and promotes private 
sector development (PSD), which it considers a key 
driver of economic growth, job creation and stability 
(Ganson & Wennmann, 2016, pp. 67–74). The IFC 
claims that “o(O)ur priority is to create opportunity 
where it’s needed most—in the poorest and most 
fragile countries, and for the most vulnerable segments 
of the population” (IFC, 2015, p. 13). It maintains that 
it will create “opportunity in strife-torn environments” 
(IFC, 2015, p. 52) through the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), which is also part of the 
World Bank Group. In 2015, the IFC invested nearly 
US $18 billion, out of which it mobilised more than 
US $7 billion from other investors, stating that the 
creation of good jobs was a priority (IFC, 2015, p. 22).
In the liberal peace narrative, MNCs are por-
trayed as acting towards greater stability in FCAS out 
of a type of enlightened self-interest. Accordingly, 
they seek to pay higher wages, respect labour rights 
and contribute to democratic transition, as suggested 
by the cases of South Africa and Brazil (Ganson & 
Wennmann, 2016, pp. 67–70). The World Bank Group 
ascribes a peacebuilding role to companies due to 
their ability to open new economic sectors, even in 
FCAS, and an assumed self-interest that may encourage 
them to support conflict resolution mechanisms and 
The private sector includes widely different 
forms: local firms that operate in the domestic market, 
regional and international firms that operate in  
different countries, formal and informal establish-
ments, legal and illegal enterprises, those built by local 
capital and those based on remittances of the diaspora. 
The main role of the private sector is a purely eco-
nomic one, largely in terms of promoting growth and 
wealth creation. Beyond this, particular roles have 
been ascribed to the private sector in the academic 
literature, but also by the international community 
and civil society as well as business associations.
Since colonialism, foreign and multinational  
corporations (MNCs) have focused on resource  
exploitation in colonies and, later, on independent 
countries, mostly for exportation. In this context,  
private companies, particularly MNCs, have been per-
ceived as promoting violence due to “corporate greed, 
indifference to suffering … political and legal manip-
ulation, loyalty to no master, and impunity” (Ganson 
and Wennmann, 2016, pp. 60–61). Until contemporary 
times, there has been a narrative that considers in-
vestment in the extractive sector and in large infra-
structure projects in particular as harmful for large 
population groups. Land users are displaced or have 
to move away due to pollution, and wealth created by 
foreign investors is barely redistributed to the local 
communities. Often, the resources are a source of 
communal conflict, or they inherently enforce a sys-
tem of patronage or support a power imbalance (see, 
among many others, Dinham & Hines, 1983; Grawert 
& Andrä, 2013; Ganson & Wennmann, 2016, pp. 35–45). 
Moreover, investments in extractive industries have 
little potential to build the local value chain or to 
generate employment (Hameed & Mixon, 2013). As a 
result, the role of the private sector in FCAS has been 
described in particularly negative terms, focusing on 
its conflict-sustaining dimensions in war economies 
(Duffield, 2001; Le Billion, 2005). 
Ganson & Wennmann (2016, p. 35) highlight an-
other narrative that runs in parallel to that on “pred-
atory companies in fragile states”. The liberal peace 
narrative re-surfaced in the context of a new wave of 
liberal state building emerging in the mid-1980s. It 
followed the classical liberal line of thought reflected 
Private sector development and peacebuilding
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NGOs and development organisations emphasise 
the joint action of stakeholders from development 
agencies, community organisations, SMEs, and some-
times local leaders, as a way forward towards develop-
ing a constructive role for companies in peacebuild-
ing. Some economists have contributed to this 
discourse by identifying peacebuilding potentials in 
the characteristics of entrepreneurship. Naudè (2007), 
for example, argues that entrepreneurship itself can 
become a tool to facilitate peace and to improve the 
living conditions of people in FCAS, where the gov-
ernment is usually not capable of promoting security 
and prosperity. However, as entrepreneurial ventures 
do not automatically contribute to economic growth, 
development and the establishment of peace, “pro-
ductive, pro-growth entrepreneurship” (Naudé, 2007, 
p. 2) will have to be created. This requires careful con-
sideration of the following six dimensions:
   \ Context of war and conflict; 
   \ Relationship between institutions and 
entrepreneurship; 
   \  Particular characteristics of entrepreneurship 
in poor and conflict-affected countries; 
   \  Scope of the market in these countries; 
   \  Human and financial capital requirements; 
   \  Relationship between government and the  
private sector in FCAS (Naudé, 2007, p. 2).
Entrepreneurship itself is not intrinsically good 
or bad, but rather depends on the structure of incen-
tives within a particular society at a certain time. 
Thus, the right incentives may lead to a productive 
economy in FCAS. Hence, rather than trying to in-
crease the number of entrepreneurs, it will be more 
important to “change the allocation of entrepreneurial 
effort into productive entrepreneurship” (Naudé, 2007, 
p. 4). Naudé considers this possible when well-func-
tioning state institutions are in place. Such institu-
tions are decisive when it comes to creating alterna-
tive profit opportunities to criminalised actions 
resulting from survivalist behaviour that entrepre-
neurs acquired during war time. This occurs especial-
ly in large informal economies that typically persist 
after the armed conflict has been settled (Naudé, 2007, 
p. 15). 
to curb the corruption of state officials (World Bank, 
2011). The fact that foreign direct investment in FCAS 
is well protected by investment treaties and insur-
ances, which restrict regulation of foreign investment 
by the host states, indicates that it is not necessarily 
pure commitment which leads to MNC engagement 
in FCAS. Ganson & Wennmann (2016, p. 76) argue that, 
in spite of this protection, MNCs nevertheless fear 
the fragile state. Accordingly, state-building has 
reached the agenda of the World Bank Group and the 
OECD as a central objective, but tied to PSD, particu-
larly in FCAS (Rodrik, 2006; OECD, 2010; World Bank, 
2011).
Consequently, during the 2000s, the assumed po-
tential of the private sector to contribute to crisis pre-
vention or conflict mitigation came into focus. A 
growing body of literature emphasises the importance 
of PSD for peacebuilding purposes because of its  
potential to help develop economies in conflict- 
affected countries (Gündüz et al., 2006; GTZ, 2009;  
Curtis et al., 2010; Peschka, 2011; World Bank, 2011; 
Avis, 2016). The World Bank continues to lead in advo-
cating for private sector investment as a means to 
create jobs and stabilise the economy in FCAS. PSD 
has become closely related to the creation of employ-
ment, as the bulk of employment in developing coun-
tries is in private enterprises – according to some  
estimates, nine out of ten jobs are in the private sector 
(IFC, 2013, p. 4). However, PSD and employment are 
not identical and not all forms of PSD are identical in 
their impact on employment. 
The emerging literature on PSD and peacebuilding 
is dominated by studies conducted by bilateral and 
multilateral development agencies as well as INGOs. 
It considers continued business activities as ‘resilience’, 
despite the challenges posed by violent conflict. The 
authors argue that due to its ability to adjust business 
activities and to change shape and direction, the  
private sector can be a powerful vehicle for recon-
struction and regeneration, playing a role in support-
ing stabilisation, spurring long-term economic growth, 
improving transparency and fostering trade (Avis, 
2016). These are areas where official development as-
sistance (ODA) has made little headway in FCAS, un-
like private business, which has had a definite impact. 
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leverage or, at the lower level, the kinds of services 
provided). They hold a variety of linkages to different 
social and political actors and strata through business 
relations (with staff, business partners, etc.), but also 
along other lines, including political, cultural, ethnic 
or religious lines.
Against this backdrop, SMEs have become the  
focus of a particular strand of literature, which builds 
on the insight that most SMEs are local in their origin 
and market orientation. Authors consider the local 
private sector to have a range of motivations for 
wanting to address fragility and conflict. Being part 
of the local private sector, SMEs are assumed to be 
more interested than large enterprises in making a 
difference in peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts, 
as they are impacted much more from conflict. When 
engaged appropriately, SMEs may deliver a number of 
benefits, as follows:
   \  Since SMEs tend to be more labour intensive 
than large firms, they can create employment, 
which could be a factor in the need to establish 
a visible peace dividend.
   \  Because SMEs depend less on imports and 
maintain more linkages with other local enter-
prises, they can contribute to quickly stimulat-
ing the local economy through investment and 
expansion. 
   \  As SMEs are more likely to have sub-national 
urban centres as their base, they can provide a 
stimulus for regional development. 
   \  Representing less economic power individually, 
SMEs are easier to deal with for national and 
local governments than larger companies (Avis, 
2016).
   \  Countries with a high share of SMEs have suc-
ceeded in making income distribution fairer 
and more equitable (UNIDO, 2001, p. 2). If this is 
true, SMEs may have the potential to alleviate 
tensions arising out of inequality.
It is important to note that these benefits may 
occur when SMEs are engaged properly. Since SMEs 
are known to be highly adaptive and less driven by 
regulation and bureaucracy than large enterprises, 
they can quickly take advantage of gaps in the 
However, claiming that well-functioning state in-
stitutions are the precondition for PSD does not re-
flect the reality in FCAS. The above characteristics of 
the economy in FCAS will have to be taken as a given 
and as a starting point from where to develop private 
sector support for peacebuilding. This perspective is 
still largely missing from the literature, be it academic 
papers or practitioners’ reports. 
Many initiatives seeking to promote PSD address 
and target the needs of multinational and large busi-
nesses, neglecting the importance of SMEs (Brück et 
al., 2015). This is a significant oversight, given that 
SMEs are the biggest contributors to employment in 
developing countries (Ayyagari et al., 2011, p. 2) and 
are the prevailing form of enterprise. So far, support 
programmes for SMEs have been oriented towards re-
ducing poverty and improving livelihood, rather than 
towards growth as an important condition for eco-
nomic reconstruction after violent conflict. Naudé 
strongly argues that an emphasis on small businesses, 
especially when it comes to the creation of start-ups, 
may enhance growth; hence, “focusing on start-ups 
that can result in pro-growth, entrepreneurial ventures 
should be an important objective when promoting 
entrepreneurship in fragile and post-conflict states” 
(Naudé, 2007, p. 7). 
The following section examines the potential 
roles of SMEs in peacebuilding and then outlines the 
environment required for such roles.
Potential roles of SMEs in peacebuilding
A growing body of literature on PSD in FCAS dis-
cusses the role that local private firms can play in 
post-conflict contexts and peacebuilding, as well as 
the appropriate support needed. Considering that  
entrepreneurs can help to spur or generate conflict, 
Killick et al (2005) claim that this in itself provides 
strong reasons for trying to engage them in a con-
structive role. In a sense, it is the deep-rooted rela-
tionship of local businesses to the conflict that is  
crucial for enabling entrepreneurs to play a peace-
building role. Local business people constitute a pow-
erful section of society (either in terms of political 
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economy exists for political as well as economic rea-
sons. Hence, it is imperative to steer clear of a  
reductionist view that perceives the informal economy 
solely in terms of economic (dis)incentives for com-
pliance with formal rules and cost-benefit decisions 
of informal operators. (Schoofs, 2015, p. 6) 
According to Schoofs (2015), in order to render in-
tervention strategies geared towards addressing eco-
nomic informality in fragile contexts fit for purpose, 
development actors need to acknowledge the follow-
ing points.
   \  Informal economies are not ungoverned spaces 
but maintain a considerable degree of govern-
ance, self-organisation and structure, where 
(informal) regulations emanate from a variety 
of non-state actors and informal institutions.
   \  State engagement with the informal economy 
is complex and can even entail negotiated  
arrangements over taxation or regulatory poli-
cies between government actors and informal 
actors. Furthermore, state representatives 
themselves can engage in informal economic 
activities.
   \  Political interests shape economic informality, 
and political actors with a vested interest in 
maintaining the informal economy may be an 
important reason for the state’s inability to  
extend its regulatory regime to the informal 
economy. 
   \  Applying labels of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ can be 
problematic – in fragile states, social legitimacy 
attributed to economic activities and the rela-
tive power of particular groups defines what is 
legal and illegal (Schoofs, 2015). 
Schoofs (2015) highlights that international  
development actors therefore need to recalibrate in-
tervention strategies geared towards addressing eco-
nomic informality in FCAS. Beyond the economic  
dimension, attention will have to be directed at the 
political and social undercurrents that sustain patterns 
of economic informality in FCAS. Moreover, questions 
about the manner in which informal economies 
shape governance, development and conflict patterns 
in FCAS have to be addressed (Schoofs, 2015).
market (Organisation for Responsible Business, 2009). 
A large proportion of SMEs, especially the smaller 
ones, are characterised by informality, which the ILO 
has framed as follows:
The informal economy comprises half to three-quar-
ters of all non-agricultural employment in develop-
ing countries. Although it is hard to generalize con-
cerning the quality of informal employment, it most 
often means poor employment conditions and is  
associated with increasing poverty. Some of the char-
acteristic features of informal employment are lack 
of protection in the event of non-payment of wages, 
compulsory overtime or extra shifts, lay-offs without 
notice or compensation, unsafe working conditions 
and the absence of social benefits such as pensions, 
sick pay and health insurance. Women, migrants 
and other vulnerable groups of workers who are  
excluded from other opportunities have little choice 
but to take informal low-quality jobs. 
(ILO, 2016a)
The phenomenon of economic informality has 
attracted the renewed attention of donors and devel-
opment agencies, focusing on the potential for job 
creation and PSD in FCAS. Yet, conventional responses 
to informal economies may not be suitable due to the 
particular challenges posed by the dynamics within 
FCAS. Development actors face a number of dilemmas 
regarding the appropriate level of engagement with 
and the development potential of informal economies, 
the envisaged role for the state and hybrid forms of 
economic governance. As Schoofs (2015) observes, the 
World Bank report on ‘Jobs’ (World Bank, 2012) does 
not elaborate on how the presumed transformational 
potential of the informal economy can be tapped. He 
argues that informal economies are predominantly 
looked at through the lens of coping and survival ac-
tivities, economic growth, social protection and, more 
recently, job creation – largely owing to the dominance 
of multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, IMF, 
UNDP and ILO, in policy discourses on the subject. 
This situation reinforces a tendency to reduce 
the informal economy to a purely economic phenom-
enon, at the expense of contemplating its intrinsically 
political character. The key point is that the informal 
IS CONFLICT SENSITIVITY APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYMENT?  \ GRAWERT, HANSOHM, NUSRAT
28 \ \ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2017
diversifying domestic economies, thus decreasing 
susceptibility to sectoral shocks or fluctuations in  
international private capital flows (Davis & Balt, 2014, 
p. 14). This stabilising quality is regarded as having 
the potential to mitigate shocks occurring in FCAS as 
well. In addition, since SMEs often subcontract busi-
ness to other small entrepreneurs or borrow equipment 
from others, they are prone to bridging horizontal  
divisions in communities through alliances; as a  
result, they can foster trust between different groups 
in FCAS (Spence et al., 2001). As locally embedded  
actors, small and medium entrepreneurs are regarded 
as being able to tackle manifestations and repercus-
sions of wider problems within their own communi-
ties (Hettiarachchi, Holdaway, & Gündüz, 2009, p. 10) 
and even as having the ability to address conflicts 
and play an active part in peacebuilding at the local 
level. The reasoning behind this can be summarised 
as follows.
   \  SMEs can be engaged for local and regional 
economic development approaches as impor-
tant actors among other stakeholders, whose 
efforts will have to be harmonised to ensure  
effective and sustainable implementation of 
PSD in FCAS (GTZ, 2009, p. 56).
   \  Cooperation in a coalition with other compa-
nies and NGOs can create a level playing field 
within the private sector, so that companies 
can fight corruption without fear of being dis-
placed by less ethical investors in situations 
where remnants of the war economy persist 
(Williams, 2013).
   \  Due to their local position, SMEs can be useful 
in early warning systems for renewed outbreak 
of conflict. Whilst the SMEs themselves will 
benefit from these early warnings as they are 
usually most affected when violence breaks out, 
local authorities and security agencies would 
also benefit. They would be able to prevent the 
conflict before it reaches an escalation point 
that is not easy to contain. To perform this role, 
SMEs need to be connected to local institutions 
so that issues can be raised and mitigation 
strategies can be developed. 
In fact, donors promoting the growth of SMEs 
and entrepreneurship increasingly are working with 
local governments to design and roll out incentive 
packages and strategies. Most of these approaches are 
addressing business constraints or directed towards 
creating an enabling business environment. Similar 
to Schoofs (2015), Lange (2014) indicates that most  
often these interventions and strategies fail to take 
into account the complex political and social dimen-
sions of which SMEs are an intrinsic part, and the im-
pact they can have on FCAS. There is a need for theo-
ries of change for inclusive SME development that do 
justice to the complexities in FCAS.
Regarding the employment-creating abilities of 
SMEs, Davis and Balt (2014) have analysed eight cases 
from different conflict-affected countries to under-
stand private sector engagement in FCAS under the 
perspective of ‘how employment can be made sus-
tainable’. The analysis leads to the following insights 
—namely, that SMEs can grow and increase employ-
ment through: 
   \  Capacity building in the framework of develop-
ment programmes or partnering with an NGO;
   \  Establishing backward and forward linkages to 
make SMEs part of a larger value chain; 
   \  Linking up with other companies, which  
requires facilitation;
   \  Providing support in gaining access to finance.
However, there is no evidence on whether in-
creased employment is sustainable and long-term 
following withdrawal of supporting programmes and 
organisations. 
Beyond the roles that SMEs might play in restoring 
the economy and providing employment, the argu-
ment of linking PSD, and in particular SME develop-
ment, with FCAS has been brought forward. SMEs’ 
flexibility in quickly taking opportunities to fill mar-
ket gaps and their embeddedness in local communities 
are the main characteristics leading to such proposi-
tions. Due to their ability to discover and occupy mar-
ket gaps, it is assumed that SMEs can easily offer 
products that create social and/or environmental 
benefits (Organisation for Responsible Business, 
2009). Moreover, SMEs are regarded as having the abil-
ity to assume a key role towards broadening and 
IS CONFLICT SENSITIVITY APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYMENT?  \ GRAWERT, HANSOHM, NUSRAT
29 \ \ WORKING PAPER 1  \ 2017
 The example of the BPA demonstrates how SMEs can be brought  
together effectively to promote responsible practices and work across 
ethno-political conflict divides. Within the BPA, SME entrepreneurs 
from across Sri Lanka are cooperating in addressing local issues, brain-
storming on solutions and sharing best practices. They have developed 
practical models for reconciliation and conflict prevention at the local 
level, as well as joint business ventures to strengthen multi-ethnic 
business partnerships. 
Initiatives undertaken by BPA members include:
   \ Joint trade fairs for people from different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds and geographies; 
   \ Community festivals – in places where communal violence had 
occurred in the past or where there was a risk of such violence, 
the business community organised community festivals aimed 
at celebrating the diversity of cultures among different com-
munities. Although sometimes criticised as not being the best 
use of resources, the festivals provided an opportunity for  
otherwise isolated communities to come together and helped 
to diffuse communal tensions. 
   \ Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives – the Ceylon 
Chamber of Commerce piloted a youth entrepreneurship pro-
gramme, where members of the chamber provided mentorship 
to young entrepreneurs from diverse ethnic, religious and  
political backgrounds 
(Mayer and Salih, 2006; see also Sweetman, 2006, pp. 43–44).  
 
through improved relationships with stakeholders, 
and at regional and national levels, companies can 
benefit from avoiding or handling conflict more ef-
fectively through a joined-up understanding of all 
conflict risks and impacts.
Based on the review of documents and studies on 
PSD in FCAS, Table 2 provides a summary of the 
broader impacts, both positive and negative, that PSD 
can have on peacebuilding efforts. It highlights the 
impact that private business can have in FCAS in fos-
tering or hindering equitable economic development, 
security, justice and stability, transparency and ac-
countability of business, building and extending in-
frastructure and supplies, and fostering human and 
workers’ rights.
   \  As many drivers of conflict are locally rooted, 
such as those instigating community tensions 
or resentment, SMEs are well placed to identify 
these drivers. Shared economic interest can be 
a powerful motivation for bringing together 
conflicting parties and thus fostering econom-
ic development in FCAS (Curtis et al. 2010, p. 4). 
Most of these propositions are directed towards 
PSD in FCAS, which is alleviated and facilitated 
through SME engagement in development pro-
grammes or initiatives. Some propositions go one 
step beyond PSD and ascribe to SMEs a role in intro-
ducing conflict-sensitive approaches that can sup-
port peacebuilding. As SMEs are situated within the 
communities where violence occurs, and hence are 
particularly affected by violent conflicts, they may  
become committed partners to peacebuilding (GTZ, 
2009, pp. 14, 63; International Alert, 2006). An example 
of this is the Business for Peace Alliance (BPA), which 
was facilitated by International Alert in Sri Lanka 
(Mayer & Salih, 2006). 
Notwithstanding the example of the BPA, there is 
still a need to better understand the role of SMEs in 
contributing to stability in FCAS, and how interna-
tional development agencies can support this. Support 
so far includes investing directly in SMEs to augment 
their operations and maximise profits, creating an 
enabling environment, building the capacity of SMEs, 
enhancing understanding of conflict sensitivity and 
implementing conflict-sensitivity measures. However, 
such initiatives proved to be unsustainable as long as 
there was no coordination mechanism to keep the 
momentum going and to include the activities and 
interests of stakeholders. As the example of the BPA 
shows, the business community’s interest in peace-
building can be sustained if such initiatives have a 
practical and tangible benefit for SMEs. 
The assumed peacebuilding potential of compa-
nies does not only pertain to SMEs. As violent conflict 
imposes a range of costs on companies, a conflict- 
sensitive approach to doing business—one that seeks 
to avoid these costs by developing informed conflict 
management strategies—is therefore a strategic 
choice for company managers. At the local level, 
Box 2  
Business for Peace Alliance (BPA): An example 
of involving SMEs in peacebuilding 
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Table 2  
SME defintions used by mulitlateral institutions
Positive impact Negative impact
Economic  
development
   \ Creating jobs and incomes
   \ Spurring long-term growth
   \ Creating potential for broader tax base
   \ Producing a trickledown effect from larger to 
smaller enterprises in the supply chain
   \ Producing goods and services
   \ Fostering trade 
   \ Places economic power in the hands of foreign companies 
or one group of local elites
   \ Can lead to greater dependency
   \ Likely to deepen existing inequalities and to create new ones 
Security, justice 
and stability
   \ Supporting stabilisation
   \ Can create enterprises which span different ethnic-
ities and religious identities 
   \ Restoring workers’ confidence
   \ Providing integration opportunities for victims 
of conflict
   \ Helping to reconcile efforts 
   \ Can exacerbate existing tensions between different groups
   \ Can raise expectations beyond what is actually achievable 
(this may also be positive or provide an impetus for 
change)
   \ Can create violent competition over contracts
   \ Some companies may have a vested interest in continuing 
the conflict
Governance    \ Ensuring that enterprises work through legiti-
mate governance processes
   \ Encouraging the use of international norms that 
may help to improve transparency, efficiency and 
accountability, for example, of accounting 
   \ Fuelling corruption among officials
   \ Undermining the long-term legitimacy of the state as a 
public service provider
 
Infrastructure    \ Encouraging commercial value chains, especially 
with international investors
   \ Can contribute to providing public goods such as 
healthcare and education
   \ Providing private goods
   \ Private sector is more likely to fail in public service provi-
sion in the long term, which is likely to increase fragility 
and instability
Humanitarian and 
human rights
   \ Providing opportunities to offer work to dis-
placed persons
   \ Providing opportunities to introduce and imple-
ment responsible business practices—for instance, 
through the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights (VPs), and 
Kimberley Process 
   \ Can negatively impact the environment and disrespect 
workers’ rights
Note: Compiled by the authors
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between government failures and market failures 
and the difficulty in determining which of these 
might be the underlying binding constraint. Among 
the specific difficulties faced in applying the ‘doing 
business’ methodology in FCAS are data gathering 
and quality, institutional weakness (affecting institu-
tional memory), limited administration and enforce-
ment ability, and audience. This is because the approach 
primarily addresses foreign investors, who will not 
come unless domestic investors, who may face differ-
ent constraints, emerge (Fowler & Kessler, 2015).
Critics of the ‘doing business’ methodology argue 
that it focuses “too narrowly on generic and econom-
ically defined business constraints. They assume a 
kind of level playing field, both between businesses 
and among countries. What they overlook, or at least 
fail to address, are the wide range of complex political 
and social dimensions that impact the potential of 
SMEs in settings marked by conflict and fragility” 
(Lange, 2014). In a broader sense, it is argued that 
challenges such as political instability, lack of security, 
poor governance, deep social divisions and structural 
inequality, which may add to the difficulty of ‘doing 
business’, are not taken into account. However, this 
critique goes beyond the intention and substance of 
the ‘doing business’ indicators, which do not claim to 
present an understanding of the economic, political 
and social dimensions that determine the environ-
ment in which businesses operate in FCAS. They  
simply present the results of certain background  
processes. The technical proposals made on the basis 
of the indicators may indeed be appropriate in the 
FCAS context. 
Not least due to these assessments of the busi-
ness climate in FCAS, most of the literature on FCAS 
considers a degree of stability and peace as a pre- 
requisite to PSD interventions (Naudé, 2007; World 
Bank, 2012, p. 196). The authors claim that, without 
this, it is unlikely that larger formal and international 
private businesses will be willing to invest, because 
there will be too many associated risks. Accordingly, 
as the GIZ argues, a “business enabling environment” 
is key to private investment and employment in any 
state (GIZ, 2009, p. 54). This implies that there should 
Environment for a positive private  
sector role in peacebuilding
The business environment in conflict-affected 
contexts is marked by enhanced risk, uncertainty 
and increased costs. These factors tend to drive up 
prices, reduce the quality and quantity of goods and 
services available, and limit competition. Post-conflict 
economies are frequently characterised by a few larger 
players, often newly emergent, which have been able 
to survive the chaos, along with numerous informal 
actors eking out a subsistence living. This profile of 
economic disparity is often true of pre-conflict eco-
nomic relationships as well, with the primary differ-
ence arising from changes in economic power: conflict 
may eliminate or reduce previously dominant busi-
nesses and increase the overall number of people at 
the subsistence level. Such disparities can create per-
ceptions of unfairness and injustice, and can badly 
undermine social stability. Moreover, conflict damages 
trust, which is one of the principal risk-mitigation 
factors that enables healthy economic relationships 
(Channell, 2010).
The World Bank’s ‘doing business’ benchmarking 
of 190 countries currently is one of the most accessible 
and widely used measures of a country’s business 
and investment climate (World Bank, 2016a). Ten sets 
of indicators document the extent of regulation, the 
time and cost to firms of regulatory compliance, the 
extent of legal protection available to investors, the 
effects of employment regulation on economic flexi-
bility and the impact of the tax regime. A sound busi-
ness environment is important for growth in all con-
texts, including that of FCAS. The World Bank’s ‘doing 
business’ indicators can be useful for identifying areas 
for government reform and for developing a pro- 
reform constituency. They provide a useful benchmark 
for initial programme design in conflict-affected  
environments, but must be supplemented by other 
diagnostic tools (Curtis et al., 2010, pp. 25–27). A useful 
complementary instrument is a growth diagnostic, 
identifying the binding (that is, the most immediate) 
constraints for growth (Hausmann et al., 2005). The 
diagnostic identifies the self-reinforcing relationship 
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The UNGC (no year) states that weak and con-
flict-prone states present an adverse incentive struc-
ture for private business, because domestic regula-
tion is poor or absent, competition over lucrative 
contracts is intense, and company misconduct may 
take place with impunity. As the private sector is 
involved in conflict as well, the objective will be to 
change incentives, an aspect also emphasised by 
Maresca (2004). Taking into account the fact that 
business is about taking risks and being competitive 
and innovative for financial gain, the right incentives 
become crucial. There are two important insights  
related to the issue of incentives – namely, that the 
economic benefits made available to combatant parties 
through war may reduce their motivation to seek 
peace and that economic interventions are not the 
panacea for peacemaking as some had hoped for (see, 
among others, De Soysa, 2016). Ballantine & Nitzschke 
(2005) contend that, when taken in combination with 
diplomatic and military interventions, measures to 
curtail the financing of conflict can apparently con-
tribute to positive outcomes. For policymakers, the 
lesson is as clear as the challenge is daunting: unless 
and until war economies are dismantled, the pros-
pects for durable peace remain poor (Ballantine & 
Nitzschke, 2005). 
Less straightforward, Peschka (2011) argues that 
PSD in FCAS requires special policies and instru-
ments, given the backdrop of the distortions caused 
by conflict and the high potential of a return to vio-
lence. Accordingly, support from international finan-
cial institutions, bilateral donors and other actors 
could potentially make a significant contribution to 
PSD by ensuring ongoing access to finance, imports 
and exports. These efforts may work best if they are 
coupled with reforms to re-establish or strengthen 
transparency, trust, effectiveness and legitimacy in 
those government institutions that provide the 
framework for private sector activities. Hence, recon-
structing the private sector is regarded as a parallel 
and interconnected process with rebuilding state 
institutions. 
In a similar vein, Avis (2016) suggests that a  
balanced strategy combining emergency employment, 
income-generating activities as part of general PSD, 
be no inappropriate regulations on businesses or ex-
cessive taxation, that investment in local businesses 
should already exist, that competition should be fair 
and that the policy environment should be stable.  
Assessments of the potential positive and negative 
impacts of PSD on peacebuilding in FCAS have to  
address these aspects. 
Altogether, these requirements seem to involve a 
task that resembles squaring the circle. Hence, the 
literature tends to focus on some aspects and ignore 
others.
Collier (2009), for example, highlights that a 
post-conflict society has to give overriding priority to 
lowering the risk of renewed conflict. Two economic 
policies in this regard are reducing military spending 
and increasing employment opportunities for un-
skilled young men. In terms of political opportunities, 
the first decade following violent conflict is best suited 
to rapid economic reform. Regarding economic pro-
cesses, Collier highlights the importance of encourag-
ing the repatriation of flight capital, of improving the 
governance of mineral rights and of managing con-
struction booms. However, none of these activities 
features very prominently in conventional post-conflict 
economic strategies. In terms of fiscal strategies,  
Collier advocates a package consisting of low taxation, 
high aid, a high-scrutiny model of public spending 
and low inflation.
With a similar implication of making a peace 
dividend accessible to the poorer strata of society, 
Gerstle & Meissner (2010) emphasise the importance 
of market development, aimed at stimulating broad-
based, inclusive economic growth that reduces poverty. 
Market development initiatives often target industries 
in which large numbers of poor people are concen-
trated, either as business owners/operators or  
employees. The objective of market development is to 
ensure that the poor participate in, and benefit more 
from, existing and potential markets in which they 
do business. These markets include the inputs (sup-
plies) and services that enable poor producers to be 
productive, as well as the final consumers that buy 
those products or services (Gerstle & Meissner, 2010).
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enforceable contract rights. The complex network of 
business laws, regulations and institutions rests on 
these foundations. Enforcement – which underpins 
all rights – depends on the existence of a continuum 
of trusted and trustworthy institutions, ranging from 
informal community pressure to formal court systems 
backed by the power of the state. The disruption of 
these institutions during violent conflict can lead  
to opportunities during reconstruction, including  
opportunities to: 
   \  Establish regulatory and legislative legitimacy;
   \  Expand and protect ownership mechanisms;
   \  Expand dispute resolution mechanisms;
   \  Expand opportunities for women;
   \  Reduce and simplify regulation  
(Channell, 2010).
Such reforms would contribute to a change in the 
investment climate, which is an important part of 
the business environment. The IFC highlights that 
reforms addressing the investment climate are criti-
cal to state-building. Reforms of government institu-
tions that regulate the business environment are  
expected to inculcate transparency, honesty, profes-
sionalism and client service – all of which are key to 
restoring government legitimacy (IFC, 2009). 
In order to pursue the parallel approach of  
rebuilding public and private sectors, business net-
works come into the focus. Gündüz et al (2006) point 
to the experience from various conflict-affected 
countries, where business networks and associations 
were strong. They suggest that these can be important 
channels for mobilising business support and lobby-
ing for policy reforms that are relevant from a busi-
ness perspective, as well as a conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding perspective. Similarly, Varshney (2001) 
found that businesses that had worked with oppo-
nents during a conflict were more sustainable and 
therefore profitable. Inter-communal businesses are 
most likely to survive because they connect the busi-
ness interests of different communities (Varshney, 
2001, p. 372). When these businesses risk losing all 
they have due to communal splits, they will alert 
their community as well as the wider public about 
the dangers of communal violence (Varshney, 2001,  
p. 378). This behaviour gives companies a more stable 
and the creation of an enabling environment 
through legal and regulatory reforms is necessary to 
support more durable economic growth and to en-
hance the private sector’s positive impact. Hence, us-
ing PSD for peacebuilding purposes may be possible 
when a balanced approach is taken, allowing the  
private sector to develop alongside a public sector 
that supports it. This balance is important because 
without government policies that stabilise markets, 
businesses will be dissuaded from investing, while 
excessive regulations will stifle competition and re-
move the autonomy of these businesses. This in turn 
could discourage investment, innovation and entre-
preneurship in various sectors (Khan & Ahmed, 2014, 
pp. 7–8). 
Some authors offer arguments seeking to circum-
vent this dilemma. The Institute for Economics and 
Peace (IEP) (2015) highlights that businesses have a 
considerable amount to gain by investing in peace. 
Violence around the world is thought to cost the global 
economy US $14.3 trillion, a figure that includes both 
the direct and indirect costs. Reducing conflict would 
mean that these funds could be invested into other 
productive areas of the economy, including private 
business. 
Gerstle & Meissner (2010) make the point that 
promoting economic recovery is highly contextual 
and cannot be simplified to a sequence or even one 
list of interventions. This is due to the broad array of 
environments and factors affected by conflict. Factor 
conditions in the economy need to be considered—
that is, endowments of land, labour and capital. A 
more viable alternative to an ideal-typical phasing of 
reform measures, which practitioners and donors 
tend to apply, will be selecting appropriate strategies 
according to a number of criteria. Among these 
should be the state of existing institutions, the sever-
ity and duration of the conflict, and its root causes 
and effects (Gerstle & Meissner, 2010).
Channell (2010) maintains that creating a business 
enabling environment offers significant challenges 
and risks in a conflict environment, as well as  
numerous opportunities for effective peacebuilding 
initiatives. Economic opportunity depends, at the 
most basic level, on enforceable property rights and 
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footing in their wider community beyond the normal 
social spheres. It suggests that business associations, 
professional groups and trade unions (along with  
political parties and sports clubs) stand out as being 
most effective in controlling conflict (Varshney, 2001, 
p. 363; see also Ganson and Wennmann, 2016, pp. 183–
193). Essentially, as most businesses will be negatively 
affected by continuing conflict, they will have a 
strong interest in maintaining peace. Therefore, it is 
important that they are involved in peacebuilding 
coalitions.
Appropriate support from external partners can 
have a great impact on the outcome of a peacemak-
ing and developmental perspective, determining if it 
is positive or negative (Peschka, 2011). Despite a broad 
consensus that the private sector has a role to play in 
preventing and resolving conflict as well as address-
ing fragility, there is mixed evidence on how best to 
engage with the sector and facilitate PSD (Avis, 2016).
Hence, whereas indicators are useful for inves-
tors and companies to provide an overview of the 
business climate in FCAS, the review indicates that 
local contexts and interactions may make a differ-
ence. Moreover, balanced public and private sector  
development appears to be crucial for overcoming 
the features of a war economy.
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linked employment and peace. Accordingly, Ofem & 
Ajayi (2008) explored youth restiveness as the indicator 
of stability in Nigeria, but with only limited method-
ological robustness (Holmes et al., 2013, p. 22). Based on 
quantitative analysis of survey data, the authors iden-
tified numerous causes of youth restiveness, including 
unemployment. However, more important were a 
lack of social welfare, bad governance, a corrupt gov-
ernment, inadequate training provision and an urge 
by youth to satisfy their basic needs (Ofem & Ajayi, 
2008, p. 143). In terms of utilising employment as a 
means to reduce conflict, the authors recommend 
providing more opportunities to youth but also up-
skilling them, as well as ensuring that there are suitable 
governance structures in place (Ofem & Ajayi, 2008,  
p. 146). Despite being criticised for its lack of techni-
cal robustness, this study’s findings highlight the dif-
ficulty of seeing the employment-peace nexus in sole-
ly economic terms. It demonstrates that although there 
is perhaps a causal link between employment and 
peace, there are other contributing factors within this 
relationship that may be required for peacebuilding.
Still, most arguments presented in the existing 
literature are based on an economic approach to 
peacebuilding, as presented by Brück et al (2015) in 
Figure 2, which shows the mutual impacts of employ-
ment and stability on each other. This approach 
Employment consistently has been identified as a 
major factor in empirical studies that identify the 
key determinants of poverty reduction in a range of 
different country contexts. However, similar studies 
were not conducted in FCAS. The literature on em-
ployment in fragile states indicates a theoretical bias, 
with many studies and policy documents being based 
on the assumption that employment creation will 
promote poverty reduction and stability. Despite the 
lack of empirical evidence, there is an agreement in 
popular international discourse that an employ-
ment-peace nexus exists, as for example in the UN 
Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Genera-
tion and Reintegration (PCEIR) policy document (ILO, 
2009) and further documents (ILO, 2012, p. 46; Holmes 
et al., 2013; World Bank, 2012, p. 126; Cramer, 2010). The 
assumption regarding the employment–peace nexus 
is largely based on the mainstream development  
literature that identifies employment as a central  
determinant of the nexus between growth and poverty 
reduction. 
The fragile states literature does highlight the  
relationship between unemployment and instability, 
adopting a range of analytical approaches—including 
political economy, institutional analysis and econo-
metrics—to argue that unemployment is a driver of 
instability (see, for example, Collier, 2006). However, 
there is not a commensurate literature offering an 
evidence base about the impact of employment crea-
tion on stability. This is possibly due to the indirect 
nature of the effect and attributional problems in 
contexts where data are scarce and research opportu-
nities constrained. As with poverty, the policy devel-
oped in this area is primarily intuitive (for instance, 
the UN PCEIR, ILO 2009). Moreover, it is based on the 
assumption that if unemployment contributes to  
instability, then employment creation will promote 
stability. Hence, despite the centrality of employment 
creation as an instrument to promote stability in the 
fragile states policy discourse, no robust qualitative or 
quantitative evidence was found to illustrate this  
relationship in the literature. 
This is confirmed by a study commissioned by 
the Overseas Development Institute (Holmes et al., 
2013), which identified only one empirical study that 
Figure 2  
Mediating institutions (formal and informal)
Source: Brück et al., 2015, p. 24
Employment–peace nexus
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frustration. The lack of opportunities and prospects 
often constitutes a major driver of conflict, fragility 
and violence (see also GIZ, 2015; Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004).
The UN PCEIR is a widely accepted and commonly 
referred to framework for employment as a peace-
building tool. The policy differentiates between types 
of job creation and their impact on peace over different 
lengths of time. Specifically, it highlights three 
‘tracks’ that lead to short, medium and long-term  
stability through employment in conflict-affected 
countries (Figure 3).
Assuming there is a connection between employ-
ment and peace, this approach seeks to demonstrate 
that different strategies need to run simultaneously 
for peace to be achieved and maintained through  
employment schemes. Track A focuses on stabilising 
income generation and providing emergency em-
ployment in the short term through employment 
programmes. This activity is often temporary in  
nature. Track B focuses on employment opportuni-
ties at the local level where reintegration takes place. 
While these programmes include capacity develop-
ment of local government, communities and NGOs, 
follows the understanding that unemployment leads 
to violence because those without jobs not only have 
less to lose by engaging in violence, but actually have 
a comparative advantage in doing so (Hirshleifer, 
2001). Thus, a logical conclusion drawn in the literature 
is that more employment opportunities for the job-
less reduce the likelihood that those individuals will 
willingly engage in violent activities because there is 
a higher opportunity cost involved in doing so.
Agenda-setting organisations promote the  
employment-peace nexus despite a lack of evidence. 
Hence, creating jobs as a peacebuilding tool is includ-
ed in the World Bank’s 2011 World Development  
report and in its report on ‘Jobs’ (World Bank, 2012). 
The World Bank assumes that peace and stability can 
be reached if the economic foundations of a country 
allow for a prosperous life for all population groups. 
In the World Bank terminology, employment and 
sustainable, pro-poor growth represent key compo-
nents of economic foundations and, hence, the basis 
for peaceful development. Unemployment and high 
inequality, on the other hand, with typical features of 
social segregation and marginalisation, can contrib-
ute to the perception of injustice and lead to 
Figure 3  
Three-tiered employment creation in FCAS
Source: UN, 2009, p. 12
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According to Brück et al (2015), moving away from 
wider economic explanations of cause and effect to 
more localised socio-political and economic factors 
could provide valuable insights into the relationship 
between employment and social behaviour. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to consider that the link 
between employment and peace could be dependent 
on the type of employment and structure of the econ-
omy. Employment in FCAS such as Kosovo was more 
likely to strengthen public service provision than it 
was in Liberia, as it was able to draw on a larger  
formal economy and stronger bureaucratic resources 
post-conflict (Brück et al., 2015, p. 25). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, simply 
equating jobs with peace is oversimplifying a highly 
complex relationship. The type of job created is far 
more important than just creating a job (World Bank, 
2012, p. 127). Brück et al. (2015, p. 36) argue that quality 
of employment can only be measured objectively to a 
certain degree, as it is located within the individual’s 
experiences, attitudes, perceptions, expectations and 
coping strategies.
Taking into account these cautionary remarks, 
the following section discusses the literature on the 
role of employment creation for stability and peace-
making as it is evolving.
Employment creation in FCAS
During armed conflict, soldiers and combatants 
form an important group of employees. Military  
experience is a poor substitute for civilian education 
and labour market experience. In settings where a 
large proportion of youth have been actively partici-
pating in fighting, aggregate economic impacts will 
be quantitatively important. The most pervasive 
impact of military service and fighting in non-state 
armed groups is the interruption of human capital 
accumulation. The large and persistent falls in earn-
ings and higher mortality reported in studies on US 
and European veterans of the Second World War are 
echoed in findings from developing countries  
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010). The new and rapidly  
growing micro-economic literature has identified 
persistently negative war impacts on individual human 
capital, especially in African cases. However, while 
Track C focuses more on the private sector. The goal  
is to promote long-term development that sustains 
productive employment and decent work, while  
respecting human rights as well as gender equality 
and integration of marginalised groups (UN, 2009,  
p. 12). Ultimately, it is hoped that the concurrent run-
ning of a programme or programmes along these dif-
ferent tracks will bring immediate and lasting peace 
to FCAS through employment. The key premise of 
Figure 3 is that while creating sustainable employ-
ment, mainly in the private sector, takes longer to  
develop, over time it will constitute the biggest part 
of all employment.
Despite the absence of a strong evidence base 
from which to assess the impact on stability of direct 
employment, enabling macro-policies or the promo-
tion of self-employment, there has been a growing 
body of literature on this. The literature includes 
many proposals on how and why employment is im-
portant during reconstruction after violent conflict 
(for example, Addison, 2001; ILO, 2003; Kamphuis, 
2005; MacSweeney, 2008; Agborsangaya-Fiteu, 2014) 
and on building up the private sector in post-conflict 
economies (for example, Nenova, 2004; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2011). A section of the literature discusses 
connections between the creation of employment 
and peace (ILO, 2009; UN, 2009; GTZ, 2009; Cramer, 
2010; World Bank, 2011). However, little of this research 
explores the micro-level or is evidence based. Much 
less studied are the effects of violence on employment.
There are four main reasons as to why it is diffi-
cult to prove an employment-peace nexus through 
research. Firstly, assessing the impact of employment 
on peace is deemed problematic because it is a long-
term process and thus requires evaluation over a long 
period of time (Holmes et al., 2013, p. 26; Watson, 2009, 
p. 9; UN, 2009; GTZ, 2009). 
Secondly, there is a lack of micro-level studies  
exploring the link between employment of at-risk 
groups and a decline in anti-social behaviour (Brück 
et al., 2015, p. 27). Whereas the assumption of an em-
ployment-stability nexus is being studied at the  
macro-level, it is then just transferred to the micro- 
level. The micro-level relates to the perceptions, atti-
tudes and expectations of individuals, where social 
norms supporting peace and stability might emerge. 
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programmes and short-term skills training. While 
conventional thinking underlines the necessity of  
security at a minimum for employment creation 
schemes to begin, development agencies increasingly 
have become aware that the risk associated with not 
engaging tends to outweigh the risks of engaging in 
the first place (GIZ, 2015).
In their review of the evidence on the impact of 
employment creation on stability in fragile states, 
Holmes et al (2013) find three broad categories of em-
ployment creation: emergency employment creation, 
long-term employment creation through enabling 
macro-policies, and self-employment. Employment 
promotion programmes always influence the distri-
bution of income, be it by offering access to jobs to 
some (and not to others) or by increasing the income 
level of certain households (and not of others) (GIZ, 
2015). However, evidence on the impacts of long-term 
employment creation and self-employment is lacking 
(Holmes et al., 2013).
Much of the literature agrees on the importance 
of cooperation by business and development actors in 
order to create employment in fragile contexts. A 
study by Davis & Balt (2014) identifies the different 
incentive structures of the private sector and poten-
tial synergies with what development agencies do to 
create employment in FCAS. The authors’ model (see 
Figure 1) demonstrates important access points for 
development actors intending to collaborate with the 
private sector in creating employment and ‘good’ jobs. 
The most significant research gap concerns how to 
integrate the private sector incentive structures in 
post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding  
strategies. This integration is important to be able to 
plot more synergies between the private sector and 
development actors’ roles in creating employment for 
stability. According to Davis and Balt, most important 
are knowledge sharing, capacity building, service  
delivery and advocacy, in order to establish common 
ground.
Pugh (2008), in contrast, focuses on the fact that 
the employment policies of interveners (comprising 
aid and development agencies as well as international 
finance institutions) exhibit a competitive market- 
led approach, which is exploited by international and 
local entrepreneurs. High exploitation of illegal refu-
the short-term impact of war is clearly disastrous, 
there is mixed evidence on how long the economic 
effects on human capital and quality of life persist.
There is another equally important feature of  
violent conflict—that is, labour force migration, even 
to other conflict areas. According to Hoeffler (2013),  
20 per cent of the 18 million migrants from fragile 
states—and more than half of the eight million refu-
gees (2012 data)—settled in other fragile states. Thus, 
migration appears to be both a consequence and pos-
sible cause of conflict and fragility. Economic factors, 
such as higher wage incomes, are a central motiva-
tion for migration. Given the militant socialisation of 
the youth and the migration of large groups, PSD  
programmes in FCAS may create employment, but 
mainly for skilled foreign labour rather than local 
jobs for local population groups.
Private sector development and employment  
creation are strongly related to each other, but not 
identical. While most employment is in the private 
sector, this is not true for all employment. Especially 
in the shorter term, employment creation schemes, 
driven by aid agencies or governments, are required 
to get local war-affected population groups involved. 
With the multiplicity and complexity of conflict  
drivers, ranging from a mix of unique yet overlapping 
political, social, economic and security factors, there 
is a great potential for economic development inter-
vention (GTZ, 2009, p. 12). 
Dudwick (2013, p. 17) and others emphasise the 
importance of re-establishing social cohesion after 
protracted violent conflict. They argue that whether 
or to what extent employment can help build social 
cohesion, or whether social cohesion can promote 
employment, depends crucially on the institutional 
environment, and this environment is largely deter-
mined by government policies. Without certain guar-
antees of physical security and the application of rule 
of law through a strong judiciary, businesses are un-
likely to risk investing in FCAS, and hence will not 
create employment. As a consequence, approaches to 
employment promotion that neither require a strong 
network of trust nor rely on close collaboration 
between actors have better chances of yielding posi-
tive results in the short term. Such approaches in-
clude ‘cash-for-work’, ‘food-for-work’, ‘cash-transfer’ 
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are protected by the self-interest of entrepreneurs 
and the monopoly of force in a minimal state. The 
distribution of resources among entrepreneurs in 
civil wars, but also resource distribution by interven-
ing agencies in FCAS, circumvent the social contract. 
Prioritising market liberalism and deregulation in 
FCAS is taking place alongside protection of the  
interveners from competition. Against this backdrop, 
building peace will enhance existing inequities 
(Pugh, 2008, p. 144).  
From conflict-sensitive business to 
conflict-sensitive employment: Needs 
and challenges
Returning to the discussion on the potential role 
of businesses in peacebuilding, the UN PCEIR frame-
work for employment creation in the private sector 
has some of the characteristics required for conflict 
sensitivity. Its main rationale is that in situations 
where economic grievances are among the major 
causes of conflict, economic development can have 
great potential and PSD is crucial to help fuel economic 
development. Authors agree on the importance of  
applying strategies that are sensitive and relevant to 
the particular conflict (UN, 2009; Curtis et al., 2010,  
p. 9; Norton & de Haan, 2012, p. 16; Goldwyn & Chigas, 
2013). 
In this regard, development agencies increasingly 
have offered guidance on how to design conflict- 
sensitive PSD programmes in FCAS. The German  
Federal Government aid agency (GTZ, 2009) has devel-
oped a comprehensive framework on how to make 
economic development conflict sensitive, including 
requirements for the private sector. There are also 
two guidebooks developed by the Donor Committee 
for Enterprise Development (DCED). The first guide-
book outlines PSD tools that could be used in con-
flict-affected environments, but ultimately suggests 
that PSD programmes should be flexible, provide prac-
tical support, recognise the long and short-term is-
sues, be innovative, prioritise certain interests, be re-
alistic, accept risk, and be coordinated and coherent 
(Curtis et al., 2010, pp. 10–11). It emphasises that the 
drivers and issues of each conflict are complex and 
often unique. Hence, there is no definite blueprint 
gee workers is the norm. Bureaucratic hindrances  
entailed in securing formal employment leads to the 
definition of special target groups that are considered 
as having special needs. Hence, the ILO has tailored 
special programmes for internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), refugees and returnees, including those involv-
ing the restitution of property and land. Ex-combatants 
have special needs too. The youth are usually excluded 
from decision-making in peace processes, although 
they have had a role in the conflict as income genera-
tors and security providers. They may join gangs or 
the informal sector. Emergency job creation schemes 
for ex-combatants and the youth are set up because 
they are considered a danger. Opportunities have been 
found in agriculture, services, retail and construction, 
but not in industry and value- added production. A 
building boom, which often follows a peace agreement, 
tends to cause a surge in imported materials rather 
than invigorating local supply (Pugh, 2008, pp. 146–147). 
Women’s income generation projects by the ILO 
leave women at low and precarious levels and do not 
redress job loss in the public sector or industry. 
The ILO may sponsor start-ups, training, intern-
ships and apprenticeships, but not strategic employ-
ment creation for these ‘vulnerable groups’. Setting 
up mobile phone networks and facilitating credit for 
transport, trade and export promotion does not create 
long-term employment strategies. Strategies to em-
power at least one breadwinner per family through 
employment programmes seek to make people inde-
pendent of aid, but they do not establish socio- 
economic rights for disadvantaged social classes. This 
fosters frustration and migration. Pugh argues that, 
in the liberal peace framework, fragmentation,  
regrouping and material impoverishment of social 
capital makes labour vulnerable to post-conflict  
exploitation. Labour unions may split along ethnic 
lines, protecting jobs for some and excluding others. 
Security companies may flourish with high-risk wages 
and suspension of rights for employees (Pugh, 2008, 
pp. 148–149). 
Pugh claims that the neoliberal approach pushes 
socio-economic rights out of the zone of human  
responsibility and side-lines them in favour of civil 
and political liberties (Pugh, 2008, p. 143). It privileges 
liberty over justice, so that assets take priority and 
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Hoffmann (2014) suggests that for the private sector 
to acquire a deeper understanding of the political 
marketplace, cross-sector cooperation with local 
stakeholders and development actors is needed. She 
argues that, so far, such collaboration has been on an 
ad hoc basis at best, and that there is ample scope for 
a more systematic approach.
Hoffmann concludes that whether a business 
can avoid harm and help build peace will not depend 
on the company alone, but depends on “the commit-
ment of the international development community 
to systematically engage with the private sector: to 
jointly build up a sound business case for conflict 
sensitivity and to supplement the existing wealth of 
guidelines with practical support and concrete possi-
bilities for cross-sector collaboration” (Hoffmann, 
2014, p. 6). This includes, among other things, invest-
ment in cost-benefit analyses demonstrating the  
financial returns on investment in conflict-sensitive 
business strategies, encouragement of shared learn-
ing from business impact assessments, and creation 
of multi-stakeholder observatories to enhance collab-
oration between businesses, donors and civil society 
actors. Moreover, international agencies should com-
plement this by providing trainings in doing busi-
ness in FCAS and, at the same time, engage in policy 
dialogue with government. Development programmes 
should create an enabling business environment that 
connects peacebuilding and economic interests inte-
grally (Hoffmann, 2014).
The suggestion of business entanglement in a  
political marketplace is important with regard to 
FCAS, where patronage relationships prevail and 
markets tend to be structured along political-eco-
nomic power contestations. However, Hoffmann over-
looks the fact that ‘local stakeholders’ and even ‘de-
velopment actors’ are usually part of this ‘political 
marketplace’ as well (see de Waal, 2016) and not dis-
tanced outsiders.
The focus of these frameworks and guidebooks  
is on conflict-sensitive PSD, which is implicitly  
assumed to have a positive employment effect. The 
publications presume that there is an employment- 
peace nexus and do not explore whether employ-
ment has a causal relation to peace. Conflict-sensitive 
employment appears to be a subordinate aspect of 
that one can follow to ensure that PSD contributes to 
conflict alleviation (Curtis et al., 2010, p. 14). This 
means that using a conflict-sensitivity approach  
requires a preceding analysis of each specific context 
to ensure that programming is relevant to the specific 
conflict. The second guidebook presents methods of 
measuring results and achievements of PSD in reducing 
conflict (Fowler & Kessler, 2015).  
An example of a conflict-sensitive approach is an 
agribusiness investment that is made after negotiat-
ing access to land with the relevant government and 
traditional authorities, as well as analysing the im-
pact of the investment on relations between different 
community groups in the area. If the investment  
exacerbates tensions between pastoralists and farmers, 
and causes violence between them, this will consti-
tute a ‘conflict-insensitive’ business. A conflict- 
sensitive approach would reveal the presence of  
underlying conflicts between different livelihood and 
ethnic groups. It would lead to a project design that 
takes account of and mitigates the problem—for  
instance, by leaving transhumance routes intact or, if 
this is not possible, by seeking land elsewhere (Inter-
national Alert, 2015).
Conflict sensitivity requires the ability to under-
stand the context of intervention, including inter- 
group tensions, the divisive factors and those factors 
that have the potential to connect groups across con-
flict lines. Hoffmann (2014) makes the point that the 
intrinsic challenge for private sector actors trying to 
acquire such an understanding lies in the fact that 
foreign and, even more so, domestic businesses oper-
ating in contexts of fragility and conflict are, or  
become, inherently part of the political marketplace. 
This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for them to 
conduct such an analysis on their own—for example, 
as part of a due diligence or risk assessment procedure. 
Related to this is understanding the impact that  
intervention and context have on each other. Entre-
preneurs and employees have to be aware that they 
will never be perceived as neutral. The assumption 
that businesses can operate as apolitical agents in 
highly political contexts has been proven wrong in 
cases where actions by international investors or 
local businesses have had harmful consequences. 
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Hence, decent work is by no means the responsibility 
of companies and investors alone, but requires rules 
and regulations by the state. Conflict-sensitive em-
ployment even exceeds the standards for decent work, 
the Human Rights Convention and the International 
Labour Standards of the ILO. 
Ultimately, conflict-sensitive employment calls 
for employment practices that do not cause or exac-
erbate conflict. This demand not only relates to em-
ployers, but also governments. Company contributions 
to conflict-sensitive employment can involve par-
ticular employment practices, among them labour  
recruitment practices that are sensitive to local con-
flict dynamics and contexts, providing opportunities 
for training, including on-the-job training, decent 
wage levels and humane labour conditions.
Because of the high proportion of employment in 
the informal sector, companies and employers in  
informal economies have an important role to play in 
creating conditions for conflict-sensitive employment. 
In societies affected by violent conflict, low-paid or 
unpaid jobs, subsistence agriculture and petty trade 
prevail. Many people are doing several jobs at a time, 
and women become more involved in jobs in societies 
where they usually do not work in public. Illegal  
activities often provide a source of income as well, 
but according to the World Bank they are “distorting 
incentives and generating rents” (World Bank, 2012,  
p. 194). The World Development Report 2013 states 
that “informal jobs can also be transformational” 
(World Bank, 2012, p. xiii). In its section on conflict- 
affected countries, the report also highlights that 
jobs are not only crucial for making a living, but also 
for restoring the social fabric and “breaking cycles of 
violence” (World Bank, 2012, p. 193). As a consequence, 
the World Bank has taken the lead towards a new fo-
cus on PSD and job creation, now touted as important 
stepping stones for transition out of conditions of  
violent conflict and fragility. This has placed the  
informal economy at the centre of policy discourses 
and international support strategies once again. 
However, questions remain about how conflict- 
sensitive employment can be introduced in FCAS and, 
in particular, in the informal economies prevailing in 
violence-affected societies. 
conflict-sensitive (private sector) development, which 
is not addressed separately in the literature so far.
Presumably, conflict-sensitive business behaviour 
is strongly related to employment. Employment is  
regarded as reducing the probability of joining armed 
groups, especially for youth. The assumption is that 
the high proportion of youth in many societies,  
referred to as the “youth bulge” (Urdal, 2004), may  
potentially contribute to incidences of insurgency or 
civil war if young people have no prospect of employ-
ment and, as a result, may be easily recruited into 
armed groups for payment (Collier, 2000, p. 4). Under-
employment may be just as significant a cause as  
unemployment in terms of creating tensions (Cramer, 
2010, p. 6). However, the link between employment 
and conflict is not straightforward. The World Devel-
opment Report 2013, for example, warns that cash-for-
work programmes will have divisive effects on society 
if all groups are not considered and the context remains 
affected by violence. Hence, “not all jobs are alterna-
tives to violence, especially if they provide little income 
and the work is drudgery” (World Bank, 2012, p. 195). 
Conflict-sensitive employment should not only 
focus on job creation therefore, but on meaningful 
job creation so that individuals or communities con-
sider the jobs as providing future prospects (Cramer, 
2010, p. 6). Moreover, employment should be inclusive 
so that divisive effects with the potential to create 
conflicts are avoided. Private sector employers can 
contribute to this, but even more important are gov-
ernment policies and, in particular, the ministries in 
charge of education, labour, economy, development 
and those responsible for each economic branch 
(such as agriculture, industries, irrigation, forestry, 
fishery, transport, construction, trade) as well as the 
employment strategies of the public sector. The ILO 
standards for decent work underline the same inter-
connection. They comprise “opportunities for work 
that is productive and delivers a fair income, security 
in the workplace and social protection for families, 
better prospects for personal development and social 
integration, freedom for people to express their con-
cerns, organize and participate in the decisions that 
affect their lives and equality of opportunity and 
treatment for all women and men” (ILO, 2016b). 
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ILO labour standards for a number of groups identified 
as ‘vulnerable’, according to categories used by the  
respective agency. Private solutions that appeal to  
individual self-responsibility are promoted instead of 
fostering sustainable public investment—for instance, 
in education and vocational training. As analysts 
from this perspective contend, there is a political 
marketplace which greatly influences economic  
decision-making according to interdependencies in 
the complex patronage networks prevailing in FCAS. 
Investment and money flows are triggered instead by 
opportunities anchored in beneficial relationships 
than by liberal market considerations. International 
development assistance and investment will be 
channelled accordingly, thus feeding patronage net-
works and benefitting selected clientele. Companies 
either have to be part of powerful networks or to pay 
high compensation in the form of bribes to corrupt 
government authorities and officials and/or non-
state power holders. This explains why concerted en-
gagement by public policy actors towards conflict- 
sensitive PSD may not work towards its intended aim.
Insights gained from the literature applying a  
political economy perspective shed some light on 
three of the dilemmas outlined in the introduction. 
Firstly, the analyses clarify that the given structures 
in FCAS are hardly state dominated, but that there is 
dispersed domination including dispersed means of 
coercion among various power centres. These power 
centres will use companies operating in their sphere 
of influence to generate revenue. They will abstain 
from any law enforcement and act arbitrarily or im-
pose regulations that are valid locally. Therefore, if  
international agencies try to implement regulatory 
frameworks, they will have to pragmatically deal 
with the existing power centres because the state in 
FCAS, by definition, will not reliably implement and 
enforce rules. Direct support and funding of investors 
and companies aimed at implementing conflict- 
sensitive employment may help. However, given the 
likelihood of their connections to patronage networks, 
it is likely that they will siphon off funds and that the 
result may be small or non-existent, unless the com-
panies envisage greater profitability for their business 
if they pursue conflict-sensitive employment 
The literature review has revealed two contradic-
tory perspectives on the potential of private sector 
companies to contribute to peacebuilding or at least 
to act in a conflict-sensitive way. One perspective is 
informed by the assumption that private entrepre-
neurs have an inherent interest in peace—and hence 
in contributing to peacebuilding—due to their need 
for an attractive business climate that poses low busi-
ness risks. The argument put forward by the World 
Bank and mainstream economics analytical literature 
is that, in FCAS, building or rebuilding state institu-
tions should be undertaken in parallel with providing 
incentives for investment in PSD. This means, more 
specifically, providing advantageous loans or insurances 
for large companies and for both SMEs and large 
companies, giving financial support for any other 
than normal business activities related to overcoming 
societal divisions or other aspects of peacebuilding. 
The actors envisaged for such cooperation are devel-
opment agencies, civil society organisations, commu-
nity-based organisations and local government offi-
cials, whose task will be to ‘engage’ with companies 
towards conflict-sensitive business practices. This  
approach presumes a harmonious society that will 
achieve peace by enhanced cooperation, which appears 
to be feasible if the right incentives and technical 
conditions (such as creating platforms for dialogue) 
are provided by international supporting agencies. 
Underlying this outlook is the narrative of liberal 
peace.
By contrast, the political economy perspective 
starts from the assumption that there are diverse and 
contradictory interests in FCAS, some of which thrive 
during periods of extended war and others during 
times of peace, according to the ease of making profit. 
Competing political power centres exist, both state 
and non-state. Activities of external interveners—
such as the World Bank or INGOs as well as local  
governments or community organisations—are con-
sidered as being guided by their own interests. Exam-
ples include taking over the representation of certain 
groups in society in an advocacy like way (in lieu of 
mostly weak or prohibited workers’ unions) and  
supporting short-term jobs or small-scale self- 
employment. The working conditions will be below 
Conclusion
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representatives that make their own agreements in 
parallel networks. These can include procedures for 
labour recruitment that are sensitive to local conflict 
dynamics and contexts, or provisions for training  
opportunities, adequate wage levels and labour condi-
tions, among others.
In addition, conflict-sensitive business and  
employment practices must be a matter of bilateral 
negotiations between neighbouring states, regional 
investors and employers with international branches. 
This is because FCAS most often have regional and 
international links and dimensions, with distrust 
and social divisions as well as war economies extend-
ing beyond local or national levels. The known pattern 
of preferred employment of foreigners over locals,  
often exerted by international agencies and companies, 
will require changes if conflict sensitivity is the aim. 
How locals can get equal chances requires more  
empirical research, but one factor is already obvious— 
namely, the skills difference. However, in FCAS, more 
aspects than skills inform employment strategies, 
and these will need to be identified by empirical  
research. Case studies may be most useful, provided 
that the particular history, context and structures of 
relationships within regions differ greatly across the 
FCAS existing in the world.
Hence, the fourth dilemma outlined in the intro-
duction remains unresolved so far. Further empirical 
research has to establish, for particular cases of FCAS, 
what are the existing competing offers for employment, 
what attracts employees to one or more of them and 
under what conditions, and what role do business 
strategies play in helping to foster conflict-sensitive 
employment. 
Most importantly, regarding the topic of conflict 
sensitivity in the private sector and in employment, 
is the need for more research in FCAS – not from a 
‘post-conflict’ or ‘transition’ perspective, which  
assumes the rebuilding of dominant state institutions, 
but under conditions where violence is rising again. 
This is a typical pattern in FCAS that has been ignored 
nevertheless in empirical studies. Empirical research 
must openly address the following questions, among 
others. What complementary roles can be played by 
the private sector—and particular sub-sectors of it 
strategies. It is yet unknown what shape this will 
take, how strong local variations will be, and what 
differences between state and non-state spheres of 
influence will look like. As a result, empirical research 
is required at the micro-level.
How can private companies implement conflict- 
sensitive business practices?  
As the literature on PSD often focuses on growth 
strategies, it should be emphasised in conclusion that 
simply stimulating growth in FCAS, which are  
characterised by structural injustices, inequality,  
corruption and patronage, may reinforce or reignite 
violent conflict. Further empirical research is required 
to understand the impacts of PSD, including growth 
strategies and other economic policies, on different 
social groups and on local institutions in FCAS.
How can conflict sensitivity be applied to employment? 
Conflict-sensitive employment requires the  
creation of meaningful jobs providing future prospects 
for individuals and countering divisive effects in 
communities in FCAS. Taking the results of the litera-
ture review into account, this will require either exter-
nal funding with a long-term perspective for upgrading 
skills adjusted to the local market, or a process of 
self-organisation of workers’ interests and the forma-
tion of trade unions. Given the conditions in FCAS, 
these are likely to be embedded in patronage networks 
and may use the relevant bargaining means to  
advance the particular interests of certain clientele. 
If the patronage networks have divided structures, 
the divisive effects of trade union formation of this 
kind can hardly be avoided. Moreover, enforcement of 
regulations and standards agreed upon will depend 
on the modes prevailing in the patronage system and 
will not likely be exerted by the state in FCAS.
Conflict sensitivity also requires that employment 
practices do not cause or exacerbate conflict. Employees, 
employers and governments need agreements with 
this aim and comprising procedures that every party 
can rely on. In FCAS, which are usually structured 
strongly along patronage networks, there may be  
various groups of employees, employers and either 
government or other controlling group 
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A sobering result of this literature review is that 
the scope for general lessons from other FCAS for a 
specific country is more limited than assumed by 
most. Any study has to give more attention to the 
specific characteristics of the country studied. 
—and the public sector? Which investors are available 
and what role can they assume under conditions of 
rising armed conflict in FCAS? Under what conditions 
is infrastructure building possible, and can it pursue 
a conflict-sensitive business strategy and have con-
flict-sensitive employment effects? What is the role 
of public and private actors in such contexts? Does 
infrastructure, similar to employment creation, have 
to begin—and be supported by development agencies 
—before violent conflict ends? 
A final question relates to how entrepreneurs—
who rationally act in the short term, sometimes in 
the illicit sphere, and link up with local power net-
works to make gains in a ‘political marketplace’—can 
introduce conflict-sensitivity standards. Military  
officers or warlords who are also business people may 
have SME clientele depending on them. Against this 
background, there is a need to identify which incen-
tives will make them act as conflict-sensitive em-
ployers. Also, during ongoing conflicts, can financial 
and material international assistance be conditional 
and reach these networks for meaningful investment 
and with sustainable outcomes in terms of skilled  
labour, solid infrastructure, regional trade and a win-
win situation for a larger part of society in FCAS? The 
self-governance systems and local orders emanating 
from non-state social and economic institutions will 
have to be taken as a given structure and framework 
of equal importance to state structures (which are of-
ten entangled with the ‘informal’ structures anyway) 
when it comes to negotiating on conflict-sensitive 
PSD and employment approaches. Obviously, beyond 
the need for empirical research on employment in 
FCAS experiencing rising violence, there is also a re-
quirement for theories of change in such settings, 
particularly regarding economic change.
On a more general note, the institutional envi-
ronment, its changes in FCAS, and the avenue for pos-
itive changes towards more stable institutional ar-
rangements, is not given much attention - if any - in 
the reviewed literature. In order to assist stabilising 
and developing FCAS, much more attention has to be 
given to institutional factors.
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Initiatives towards conflict-sensitive 
business
   \  OECD/DAC network on Conflict, Peace and  
Development Cooperation (CPDC)—established 
in 1997 to promote conflict-sensitive business 
standards, the CPDC brings together conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding experts from  
bilateral and multilateral development agencies, 
including UN organisations, the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, for meetings to  
define and develop common approaches in 
support of peace (OECD, 1997).
   \  Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights (VPs)—established in 2000 by a number 
of mainly Western countries (currently nine), 
big companies and international non-govern-
mental organisations (INGOs) in the extractive 
and energy sector (Voluntary Principles on  
Security and Human Rights, 2016).
   \  Kimberley Process—a joint initiative established 
in 2000 by governments, business and civil  
society organisations to stem the flow of blood 
diamonds (Kimberley Process, 2016).
   \  Publish What You Pay campaign—launched in 
2002 to help citizens of resource-rich developing 
countries hold their governments to account 
on revenue from extractive industries (Publish 
What You Pay, 2016).
   \  UN Global Compact—developed a Conflict  
Impact Assessment and Risk Management 
guide in 2002 (UNGC, 2002).
   \  United Nations Human Rights Office of the 
High Commissioner (UNOHCHR) Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights— 
established in 2011 to implement the UN 
‘Protect, respect and remedy’ framework, which 
provides companies with a guide on how to 
‘protect, respect and remedy’ potential abuses 
in their supply chains (UNOHCHR, 2011).
   \  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI)—a coalition of currently 51 countries 
that encourage transparency in the oil, gas and 
mining sectors and that agreed on a common 
standard in 2013 (EITI, 2016).
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